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This thesis uses event study method to examine the stock price reaction to announced 
order contracts. Although numerous event types have been studied with the method over 
several decades, order contract announcements are rarely analysed but still very 
important especially in project-based business. The research sample consists of two 
minerals and metals processing technology companies: Outotec Oyj and FLSmidth Co. 
A/S. Besides defining the general stock reaction to order contracts, the sources of cross-
sectional variation are tested. 
 
There are two main objectives in this research. The first one is to identify issues 
concerning the usage of event study method. This is particularly important because the 
sample size of two companies creates some methodological challenges. First objective 
is achieved by conducting a literature review of past researches in the field of event 
studies. Second objective is to define the general stock market reaction to announced 
order contracts and seek for explaining variables for cross-sectional variance. The 
variables that are tested in hypotheses are company net income percentage, order 
contract value, business area operating margin and inflation level. The hypothesis 
testing is done with regression analysis. 
 
The results show that significant stock price reaction to order contract announcement is 
found on event day and it is positive as expected. Comparison between companies 
indicates that higher net income percentage yields higher positive stock price reaction. 
Order contract value is found to be explaining factor of abnormal return variance to one 
company and inflation level to the other company. For academics the research brings 
new information to company fundamental valuation and clears some methodological 
issues. For managers, the results imply that investors are well aware of order size 
expectations, so effective investor communication is essential. The abnormal return 
variance stays unexplained for the most part, meaning that non-systematic factors 
contribute highly to the stock reaction of order contract announcements.  
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Tässä työssä hyödynnetään tapahtumatutkimusmenetelmää selvittämään 
tilaussopimuksen julkistamisen vaikutusta osakekurssiin. Vaikka tapahtumatutkimuksia 
on tehty vuosikymmenten ajan lukuisista eri tapahtumatyypeistä, tilaussopimukset ovat 
hyvin harvoin tarkastelun kohteena, mutta silti erittäin tärkeitä etenkin 
projektivetoisessa liiketoiminnassa. Tutkimusotos sisältää kaksi metalli- ja 
mineraaliprosessointiteknologiayritystä, Outotec Oyj:n ja FLSmidth Co. A/S:n. Yleisen 
osakereaktion tutkimisen lisäksi tutkimuksessa testataan mahdollisia lähteitä 
osakereaktion varianssille. 
 
Tutkimuksessa on kaksi päätavoitetta, joista ensimmäinen on tunnistaa 
tapahtumatutkimusmetodologian olennaisia piirteitä ja ongelmia. Tämä on erityisen 
tärkeää, koska pieni otoskoko aiheuttaa metodologisia haasteita. Ensimmäinen 
tutkimustavoite saavutetaan suorittamalla kirjallisuuskatsaus menneisiin 
tapahtumatutkimuksiin. Toinen tutkimustavoite on määrittää yleinen osakereaktio 
tilaussopimuksen julkistukseen ja etsiä selittäviä muuttujia reaktion eroihin otoksen 
sisällä. Testattavat muuttujat ovat yrityksen liiketulosprosentti, sopimuksen arvo, 
liiketoiminta-alueen käyttökateprosentti ja inflaatiotaso. Muodostetut hypoteesit 
testataan regressioanalyysilla. 
 
Tulokset osoittavat, että hypoteesin mukainen positiivinen osakereaktio syntyy 
tapahtumapäivänä. Vertailu yritysten välillä tuo ilmi, että korkeampi liiketulosprosentti 
aiheuttaa suuremman reaktion. Tilauksen arvo on selittävä tekijä epänormaalien 
tuottojen varianssille toisessa yrityksessä, ja inflaatio toisessa. Liiketoimintatieteeseen 
tulokset tuovat uutta informaatiota perustavanlaatuiseen yritysvaluaatioon ja selventävät 
metodologisia ongelmia. Yrityksille tulokset implikoivat, että sijoittajilla on vahvoja 
odotuksia tulevien tilausten arvoista, joten tehokas sijoittajakommunikaatio on tärkeää. 
Epänormaalien tuottojen varianssista suurin osa jää selittämättä, joka tarkoittaa sitä, että 
ei-systemaattisten tekijöiden rooli vaikutuksen suuruudessa on merkittävä. 
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α Intercept term in regression model 
β Beta (or correlation or market sensitivity) coefficient 
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ε Error term 
ζ Disturbance term 
θ Estimation parameter vector 
µ Mean return rate 
σ Standard deviation 
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λn Systematic factor 
ANOVA Analysis of variance 
APT Arbitrage pricing theory 
CAPM Capital asset pricing model 
CRSP Center for Research in Security Prices 
CSR Corporate social responsibility 
EAFE Europe, Australia, Far East index 
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes 
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OLS Ordinary least squares method 
OMXC OMX Nordic Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
OMXH OMX Nordic Helsinki Stock Exchange 
P/E-ratio Price per earnings ratio 
R2 Coefficient of determination 
SCAR Standardized cumulative abnormal return 
SIMM Single-index market model 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For many companies getting valuable order contracts to fill the order backlog is the 
lifeline of their whole business. Without orders there is no revenue and without revenue 
there can be no profits. In project-based business rational investors are seeking to invest 
their money into a company that displays high profits with a solid order book to get a 
good and sustainable return to their investment. Winning profitable orders is crucial in 
this game, so the relation of investor sentiment and outdoing competitors in valuable 
order contracts is highly relevant subject in the field of business and financing. 
From the academic perspective it is interesting to know if the widely acknowledged 
market hypotheses apply to the event type of order contract announcements which is the 
core of contract-driven business, or is the essentiality of order contracts valued to stock 
price from other financial indicators such as quarterly value of order backlog. Also, the 
existence of the reaction indicates if the order contract announcements really are new 
information to the market or is the information leaked before the announcement. 
Unintentional information leakage is possibly valuable information to sample 
companies. Other useful aspect from the company perspective is the knowledge of their 
investors’ rationality regarding order contracts: the company probably knows at least 
roughly how much profit a specific order generates, so comparing the actual profit to 
the change in market capitalization can indicate if companies successfully communicate 
the scale of their business activity to investors, and if some of their order contract 
announcements are overvalued or undervalued in the eyes of their investors. 
From the investor perspective event studies in general give important insight on how 
stock reacts to certain events, and that insight can be used to explore new profitable 
investment strategies. In many occasions event studies explain the time frame where 
abnormal returns are possible to generate, and thereby giving a straightforward 
investment recommendation. Of course, if markets find out about a systematical 
abnormal return, the phenomenon should disappear when investors change their 
behavior according to the new knowledge. In this study the amount and timing of 
abnormal return is examined, thus a so-called free lunch opportunity for investors is a 
possible result. At minimum, the results of this thesis allow investors of the two sample 
companies to get a better idea of how to adjust their investment strategy regarding order 
contract announcements. 
In this particular study two sample companies are selected because it serves the needs of 
the background project behind this thesis. Although the small sample size creates 
methodological challenges and reduces generalizability, the unorthodox sample also 
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allows testing event study methodology in a different setting. This case-like approach is 
rarely seen in event studies, so one main aim is to explore how event study method can 
be applied to create company-specific results. 
1.1. Research objectives 
Although the event study methodology has a long history and a vast amount of different 
events have been studied, the area of order contracts in shareholder value creation is still 
quite untouched. At first, the relation of order contracts to company success seems self-
evident, but if the event is probed more thoroughly, the area can bring new insight on 
how shareholders respond to the main business activity of the case companies. The main 
research question of this thesis is: 
How do investors react to announced order contracts? 
To answer the question, the objectives of this thesis contain multiple aspects of event 
studies. Following the event study categorization of Bowman (1983) and Henderson 
(1990) this study is partly a methodology study with its purpose in defining an 
appropriate event study methodology that fits the other details of the research design to 
achieve robust results. The objective for the methodological research comes from the 
needs of the background project, where the methodological findings of this thesis are 
later applied to study other types of events. The research objective arising from the 
methodological part of event studies is: 
O1: Identify the key elements and issues of event study methodology. 
To reach the objective a review of past event study literature is done to identify the 
research design issues and to assess the suitability of various elements to this type of 
event study. Even after decades there is no standard set of methods to conduct event 
studies and the usage of different variables and statistical measures depends on other 
research elements. Therefore a methodological review is justified and valuable. 
This study is also an information usefulness study aiming to assess the general price 
reaction of order contracts to selected company stocks. The analysis of information 
usefulness of the order contracts begins from the basic market efficiency hypothesis, 
continuing to explain smaller constituents to rationalize the investor reaction to the 
events of case companies. The research objective for the information usefulness is: 
O2: Define the general stock market reaction to announced order contracts. 
To approach the objective, the stock price reactions of order contracts awarded to two 
minerals and metals processing technology companies, Outotec Oyj and FLSmidth Co. 
A/S between 2006 and 2010, are researched with event study methodology, which is 
defined by answering the first research objective. The aim is to characterize a general 
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investor reaction to find out if announcements of order contracts are meaningful to 
investors. Lastly this study is a metric explanation study seeking to find deeper 
explanation to possible cross-sectional differences in stock market reaction. The study is 
not aiming to build a model to explain the variance itself, but seeking for variables that 
would lower the variance in results. Obviously, if the outcome of the second research 
objective is that stock markets do not generally react to order contracts at all, the latter 
questions are not quite relevant. It has to be noted though, that even if the general 
reaction is not found, some subsamples may indicate a reaction so more detailed 
research is in any case necessary. Therefore, the sub-objectives of the second objective 
are: 
O2a: Does the reaction differ between the two sample companies and if so, are 
there specific characteristics that explain the difference? 
O2b: Can sample companies express and do investors perceive the implicit 
details of order contracts in their reaction? 
Objective 2a is approached by analyzing the characteristics of the companies, for 
example financial and operational key figures, corporate structures and announcement 
policies, and then reflecting the characteristics to event study results of firm-specific 
aggregate of events. Objective 2b is achieved by identifying economically significant 
factors that are related to order contracts, rationalizing the reaction to these factors to 
form hypotheses and finally testing the hypotheses with relevant cross-sectional 
aggregates of the events. 
1.2. Research approach and methodology 
The research approach for this thesis is a classical deductive approach (Saunders et al. 
2009, pp.124-125). Based on existent literature in the field of finance, econometrics and 
management, hypotheses are deduced from the theory. After deducing general 
hypotheses, they are formulated in a way that the concepts or variables in them can be 
measured using econometrical methodology. Econometrical study involves applying 
statistical methods to the analysis of an economic phenomenon (Kennedy 2003, p.1), 
and in this study the method is an established statistical method searching for the stock 
price reaction around a corporate event, i.e. the event study method. The operational 
hypotheses are tested with the method and based on the results the suggested theory is 
either confirmed or rejected. In this particular research five hypotheses are built, and 
they all contribute to the same theoretical area of order contract announcement reaction. 
Usually, a rejected theory is modified to be re-tested again to verify it. However, in this 
thesis the five hypotheses build a hierarchical structure of the underlying theory, so 
rejecting some of the hypotheses does not imply a full revision of the theory, but instead 
the result can be a combination of verified and rejected hypotheses. 
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In the event study method statistical models are applied to reach the research objectives. 
The statistical foundation is a linear regression model of the data, where ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the unknown parameters needed to calculate 
abnormal stock returns (McWilliams & Siegel 1997). In the econometrical methodology 
markets are assumed to be at least partially stochastic, and the stochastic element is 
captured in disturbance term ε (Kennedy 2003, p.3). To explain it simply: when the 
estimated abnormal return is compared to the estimated size of disturbance term, the 
power of hypothesis is tested to reach the objective of hypothesis acceptance or 
rejection. 
The data in this research is multi-dimensional observational data gathered from external 
public sources. The raw stock data is collected from stock exchange database and the 
identified event dates with additional dimensions are collected from the sample 
companies’ public stock announcement database. These two datasets are combined to 
enable relating the changes in stock price to the events and the event parameters. Even 
though some of the event details are not numerical, they are converted to be treated 
quantitatively. The research is purely quantitative, all the data is available freely and the 
methodology is aimed to be highly structured, thus the replication of the study is 
possible ensuring a high level of reliability (Saunders et al. 2009, p.125) 
The purpose of this research, according to the classification of Saunders et al. (2009, 
pp.138-141), is not unambiguously identified, but rather a mixture of descriptive, 
explanatory and exploratory purposes. The descriptive part of the thesis is aiming to 
describe the event study methodology and the general existence of stock price reaction 
to order contract announcements. The explanatory elements are visible in the more 
detailed research objectives, which seek to explain the relationship between event 
variable and stock price reaction. The exploratory side of the study includes the 
unorthodox elements of event study research design such as the limited number of 
sample companies. Thus, this research is exploring to use the event study method in an 
unusual way. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The introduction of the thesis presents the research question, research objectives, and 
the general research approach and methodology. Introduction is followed by two 
chapters of literature review, dividing the theoretical background into the justification of 
financial reaction to order contracts and into the description of methodological variation 
in event studies. The justification of financial reaction starts from introducing the event 
study methodology and the efficient market hypothesis that enables the usage of event 
study methods. The financial reaction is derived step by step from the basic stock 
valuation principles created over 50 years ago, advancing to valuating future earnings 
and eventually single order contracts. After presenting the theory explaining stock price 
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reaction and its cross-sectional variation, five hypotheses are built based on the 
theoretical findings and these hypothesis end the second chapter. 
Chapter 3 continues the literature review by evaluating the methodological details and 
options of event studies. The research design under examination contains selection of 
sample companies and events, choosing length of event window, controlling 
confounding events, choosing calculation method of abnormal returns and reporting 
relevant test statistics. Different approaches for these details are compared based on 
experiences in earlier event studies. The methodology of the study is not selected in this 
point; instead methodology is analyzed in a general manner. 
The fourth chapter introduces the case companies in a more detailed way and elaborates 
research methodology. Methodology choices are based on findings of previous chapter. 
Especially abnormal return calculation method and analysis of statistical significance is 
presented in an accurate manner to ensure the replicability of the study. After the 
research method and material is discussed, the fifth chapter includes the results of 
hypotheses testing. Hypotheses are tested one by one and the numerical results are 
supplied with brief verbal analysis. Following hypotheses testing, results are interpreted 
in a wider context, sensitivity of the results is investigated and error sources are 
analyzed. The fifth chapter ends with discussion and evaluation of the research, 
including reliability and validity analysis. The thesis is concluded in sixth chapter with a 
summary of research implications, limitations of the study and possible further subjects 
of research in this field. 
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2. FINANCIAL RESPONSE TO ORDER 
CONTRACTS 
2.1. Basics of event study methodology 
To approach the multifold and broad research method of event studies it is useful to 
start by collecting some basic definitions to this method. The originator of event studies, 
as they are essentially known also today, is a study by Fama et al. (1969) which did not 
yet use the term event study. The study aimed to “…examine the process by which 
common stock prices adjust to the information (if any) that is implicit in a stock split” 
(Fama et al. 1969, p.1). In other words, it was an event study concentrating on stock 
splits. By 1980 the term event study had been established and the following description 
of event study was given: 
“A major concern in those ‘event’ studies has been to assess the extent to which 
security returns were different from those which would have been appropriate, 
given the model determining equilibrium expected returns” (Brown & Warner 
1980, p.205) 
The definitions have been quite similar ever since with slight emphasis on different 
aspects of event studies: “Using this method, a researcher determines whether there is 
an ‘abnormal’ stock price effect associated with an unanticipated event.” (McWilliams 
& Siegel 1997, p.626) “Using financial market data, an event study measures the impact 
of a specific event on the value of a firm.” (MacKinlay 1997, p.13) “Event studies 
examine the behavior of firms’ stock prices around corporate events.” (Kothari & 
Warner 2007, p.5) 
It is good to notice that although this thesis and the previous definitions concentrate 
particularly on stock price effects of events, event study can measure other effects as 
well. For example the effect of an event on stock trading volume (Campbell & Wasley 
1996), operating performance (Barber & Lyon 1996) and stock return variance (Patell 
1976) have also been examined. The stock price effect is still by far the most common 
approach. From the aforementioned definitions we can identify some key elements that 
must be considered when conducting an event study: 
1. The events must be unanticipated. 
2. The events must have an economic effect on the company. 
3. The effect of an event is based on comparison between actual returns and 
“appropriate” returns. 
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4. The time window of the effect of an event is not unambiguously defined but 
“around” corporate events. 
In the decades after the pioneering researches this methodology has been modified and 
developed to meet the above conditions more precisely as well as to utilize the 
increasing amount of data that is available from the stock markets. One huge change has 
indeed been the digital revolution enabling higher resolution of stock data that has 
improved the accuracy of event studies. During 1970s event studies used monthly data 
(Brown & Warner 1980), but after the same authors (Brown & Warner 1985) paved the 
way by solving some critical methodological issues, the usage of daily data started to 
increase. During 1980s the first intraday data sets were also utilized to research how fast 
stock markets actually react (Jennings & Starks 1985; Barclay & Litzenberger 1988). 
When the cost of computing power constantly decreased, 1990s saw the rise of 
electronic trading and especially high-frequency trading: a computer-driven trading 
characterized by a high number of trades but a low average gain per trade (Aldridge 
2009, p.1).  Between 2001 and 2008 electronic trading grew from 25 percent to 85 
percent (Aldridge 2009, p.9) and between 2005 and 2009 the overall trading volume 
grew 164 percent (Duhigg 2009). The reaction time to new events has reduced to 
fraction of seconds with the help of ultra-low latency machine readable news that can be 
routed straight to trading systems without human interaction (Thomson Reuters 2011). 
As the pace of the stock markets accelerates, the event study methodology has had to 
match the speed thus some recent studies have been focusing on time frames of seconds 
or minutes to capture the event effects (Busse & Green 2002; Antunovich & Sarkar 
2006). The adaptation to hectic trading rhythm is just one of the changes in event study 
procedure during its forty years of existence. 
Although the general procedure of conducting event studies has been rather similar 
since 1970s, multiple variations of the details of an event study procedure can be found 
from the literature and no set of details is considered to be over others. Event studies 
can be categorized into four different types (Bowman 1983; Henderson 1990). Market 
efficiency studies are testing the validity of market efficiency assumptions, in other 
words how fast and accurately market reacts to new information. They do not usually 
contribute to management theory, but they are seeking to explore basic mechanisms or 
systematical pricing errors in financial markets. On the contrary, information usefulness 
or information content studies can carry managerial implications, as they evaluate the 
level of which abnormal returns occur when a particular type of information is released 
to markets. Another type of event study is called metric explanation in which abnormal 
returns are further analyzed with cross-sectional regression to assess which factors 
contribute to the perceived abnormal returns. This kind of studies can result in highly 
applicable results to the field of management literature. Lastly, an event study can be 
model evaluation or methodological study. The aim of those is to evaluate the 
methodological issues, such as research design, of event studies to gain better 
understanding and to improve the methodology in general. In methodological studies 
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different approaches are usually simulated to investigate what kind of results they 
produce. These four basic types of event studies are not mutually exclusive so it is 
possible to combine different approaches. For example in a same research there could 
be some new research design recommendations, a verification of market efficiency on a 
particular event and finally cross-sectional analysis of the abnormal returns. 
There are a handful of seminal methodological articles widely cited in event study 
literature and the methodological contribution of those articles is also significant in this 
thesis. Bowman (1983) identified five steps in the event study procedure: 1) identifying 
the event of interest 2) modeling the security price reaction 3) estimating the excess 
returns 4) organizing and grouping excess returns 5) analyzing the results. Seven years 
later Henderson (1990) formulated a similar five-step procedure but with a slightly more 
detailed definitions of the steps: “1) define the date upon which the market would have 
received the news 2) characterize the returns of the individual companies in the absence 
of this news 3) measure the difference between observed returns and “no-news” returns 
for each firm – the abnormal returns 4) aggregate the abnormal returns across firms and 
across time 5) statistically test the aggregated returns to determine whether the abnormal 
returns are significant and, if so, for how long”. Again, seven years later McWilliams & 
Siegel (1997) sharpened the methodology by compiling some of the theoretical 
advances made during the years. They are especially concerned about research design 
and implementation issues of event studies that deteriorate validity of results. In the 
research, three past event studies are replicated using their perception of methodological 
rigor discovering highly deviating results and practically nullifying the hypotheses 
supported in the original researches. They emphasize that their goal is not to invalidate 
the whole event study method in management research but to point out issues that 
weaken the credibility of the method. To avoid the pitfalls, a ten-step event study 
implementation guide was outlined: 
“Step 1: Define an event that provides new information to the market. 
Step 2: Outline a theory that justifies a financial response to this new 
information. 
Step 3: Identify a set of firms that experience this event and the event dates. 
Step 4: Choose an appropriate event window and justify its length, if it exceeds 
two days. 
Step 5: Eliminate or adjust for firms that experience other relevant events during 
the event window. 
Step 6: Compute abnormal returns during the event window and test their 
significance. 
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Step 7: Report the percentage of negative returns and the binomial Z or 
Wilcoxon test statistic. 
Step 8: For small samples, use bootstrap methods and discuss the impact of 
outliers. 
Step 9: Outline a theory that explains the cross-sectional variation in abnormal 
returns and test this theory econometrically. 
Step 10: Report firm names and event dates in data appendix.” 
(McWilliams & Siegel 1997, p.652) 
Compared to previously mentioned procedure lists the list by McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997) is more detailed, naming some specific methods that should be used during an 
event study. Doubling the amount of steps also structures the different stages better and 
effectively includes all the steps presented by Bowman (1983) and Henderson (1990). 
However, some definitions of the steps still leave a lot of room for interpretation. Thus 
in the following chapters, the steps proposed by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) are 
discussed one by one reflecting the content to financial market principles and to the vast 
amount of literature regarding event studies. 
2.2. Efficient market hypothesis and investor reaction 
The first step of event studies is to define an event that is providing new information to 
market. First of all, there are some fundamental principles how stock markets or 
financial markets act to information or in a wider sense what is the role of information 
in stock markets. Starting from the 1970s it has been widely studied if markets are 
efficient, ie. if they “fully reflect” available information (Fama 1970). Jensen (1978) 
suggests a simple way of expressing market efficiency: 
“A market is efficient with the respect to information set θt if it is impossible to 
make economic profits by trading on the basis of information set θt.” (Jensen 
1978, p.3) 
In addition to this simple expression of market efficiency Fama (1970) has constructed 
three forms of market efficiency to better capture the intricate details of financial 
markets: 
1. Weak form states that stock prices fully reflect all past public information. 
Therefore it is not possible to predict future stock prices based on past prices (or 
returns). 
2. Semi-strong form states that stock prices instantly change to reflect new 
publicly available information. Based on this efficiency form it is not possible to 
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benefit from new information even shortly after the information is released, 
because the information is already valuated to the stock price. 
3. Strong form states that stock prices do not reflect only available public 
information, but any information relevant for the stock. Therefore it is not 
possible to benefit from insider information that is yet to be released to the 
public. 
The validity of these three forms has been tested with many methods. Random walk 
tests and distributional tests of stock prices and returns have given strong support for the 
weak form of market efficiency. (Fama 1965; Fama 1970) Later on the weak form tests 
have been broadened to measure market efficiency in stock markets around the world, 
individually and cointegratively (Urrutia 1995; Chan et al. 1997; Olowe 1999; Cheung 
& Coutts 2001). The studies have shown that individual stock markets are, regardless of 
location and the volume of trading, efficient in the weak form. On the other hand, the 
cointegration of all the stock markets to a one efficient market hasn’t had compelling 
evidence (Chan et al. 1997; Bekaert et al. 2009) so the global market as a whole is not 
fully efficient even in the weak form. 
Semi-strong form of market efficiency is tested by measuring the lag in correlation 
between an event and the stock price. Barclay & Litzenberger (1988) found out that 
stock reacts mostly during the first 15 minutes following an announcement, but the full 
price adaptation takes at least three hours. Because of the rise of global information 
technology, the time needed for price adaptation has gradually become faster. Busse & 
Green (2002) measured the effect of CNBC on-air stock reports and concluded that 
significant returns can be made by trading within 15 seconds of a positive stock 
mention. When a stock is mentioned negatively, stock falls for 15 minutes. Longer 
timescale is possibly because of the higher expenses of gaining profits with a price drop. 
Therefore, contradictory to the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis, the effect is not 
instant so there are always some investors who can profit from the publishing of new 
information. Anyhow, this lag is getting shorter and shorter when trading technology 
and information distribution advances and already when examining stock markets on an 
hourly level the markets can be said to be efficient in semi-strong form. 
The tests of strong form market efficiency concentrate on searching for investors who 
can “beat the market” with their professional or insider information. Seminal article 
made by Jensen (1968) about investing professionals analyzed the performance of 115 
mutual fund managers. The conclusion was that professional investors cannot 
outperform buy-the-market-and-hold strategy individually or on average which means 
that strong form is valid at least for professional investors. Collecting evidence from 
various past researches Fama (1991) argues that professional portfolio managers can 
beat the market marginally but the margin is drained by the costs that information 
gathering and trading requires. On the contrary, insider information as a source of 
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significant abnormal returns has had strong evidence over time. A research performed in 
mid-70s about profitability of insider information showed 2 to 3 percent abnormal 
returns over 8 month period (Jaffe 1974), but the business environment and the insider 
trading regulations have been tightened substantially around the world since those days 
(Bhattacharya & Daouk 2002). In many countries stock exchange rules, regulations or 
laws require that companies must notify any major information concerning their stocks 
to the stock exchange without delays so insider information could not be exploited. 
Besides illegal usage of insider information, there is also the notion of legal insider 
trading. Legal insider trading refers to trading done by insiders and informed to stock 
exchange according to local trading laws or regulations. Instead of contributing against 
strong form of market efficiency, legal insider trading has been seen even as a 
contributor to market efficiency (Aktas et al. 2008), but there are still many researches 
which conclude that insiders profit from their information days before news release 
(Betzer & Theissen 2009; Acharya & Johnson 2010). Insider trading regulations are 
clearly not strict enough to turn insider trading into efficient market information thus the 
strong from of market efficiency is not valid in today’s markets. 
The scholarly support for market efficiency in weak and semi-strong forms leads to the 
conclusion that event studies in financial markets are possible as market reacts to new 
information in a certain short time frame. The evidence against strong form of market 
efficiency means that the time frame is not around the actual event – instead it is around 
the moment when information about the event is made public. Insiders could profit from 
their insider information between the actual event and the publication of the event, but 
insider trading regulations are aiming to block these “unfair” profits. This information 
asymmetry also creates a problem of information leakage. For example, if a company 
internally decides to close a plant but doesn’t announce it until months after the 
decision, there is a risk that information is gradually leaked to a bigger circle of people 
and better informed investors can valuate the event to stock price before the event is 
made public. In general, the events must be chosen in a way that possible information 
leakage is minimized. 
2.3. Stock valuation principles 
The second step in the event study procedure list is outlining a theory that justifies a 
financial response to the event, in this case announcement of signed order contract. For 
better understanding what is actually measured with stock price event studies, it is 
essential to specify what underlying elements the stock price of a company is 
incorporating. There are two somewhat different approaches to valuing stocks: first one 
is based on discounted growing cash flows that a certain stock creates to its owner 
(Gordon 1959) and second one is based on efficient arbitrage-free markets, where 
capital asset portfolios with equal risk and profit properties should have the same price 
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(Roll & Ross 1980). The second approach also discounts the future cash flows, but it 
emphasizes the role of calculating discount rate instead of the cash flow growth rate. 
Gordon (1959) formulated the question to the first approach as follows: “…what an 
investor pays for when he acquires a share of common stock … (1) both the dividends 
and the earnings, (2) the dividends, and (3) the earnings”. The empirical results support 
stock valuation theory in which an investor pays for the dividends by equation 
 !! = 1− !! − !" !!  (1)  
where P0 is the stock price at t=0, b the fraction of income the company is expected to 
retain and invest, r the rate of profit it is expected to earn on investment, k the required 
rate of profit, and Y0 the expected income at year t=0. To simplify, br can be denoted as 
the expected dividend growth rate g and (1-b)Y0 is the fraction of income divided to 
shareholders at year t=1 (D1) so the equation becomes 
 !! = !!! − ! (2)  
From this equation it is straightforward to see that price of stock depends on the amount 
of dividends, the required rate of profit, and the expected dividend growth rate. 
However, the equation poses some problems for stock valuation for example with a 
stock that does not pay dividends at the moment. In that case, D1 would be 0 and if there 
are expected dividends in the future, the growth rate g must be infinite.  To overcome 
these problems it was later argued that dividend policy is actually irrelevant in valuing 
stocks (Miller & Modigliani 1961). Dividend policy is rather just another side of 
investment policy, and combined they are the earnings of the company. Therefore, 
dividend per share can be, with certain limitations, substituted with earnings per share in 
stock valuation calculations. This approach to stock valuation clearly shows how the 
success of a stock in terms of earnings influences the stock price, but it doesn’t show the 
complex linkage to financial markets in general. 
The second approach to stock valuation, arbitrage pricing theory (APT), brings out the 
influence of macro-environment. According to APT, the stock price and return 
correlates with multiple systematic factors at some stock-specific sensitivity level. If 
markets are fully efficient, the factors and their sensitivities form market equilibrium 
where there are no arbitrage possibilities from undervalued or overvalued stocks. APT 
states that the expected return of stock j is 
 ! !! = !! + !!!!! +⋯+ !!!!" (3)  
where λ0 is the riskless rate of return, λ1, …, λk are systematic factors (loadings), and bj1, 
…, bji are correlation coefficients (betas) of stock j. (Roll & Ross 1980) The influence 
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of different factors have been researched since APT model was introduced, and strong 
support in multiple countries has been found for macroeconomic variables such as the 
spread in interest rates, inflation, industrial production, oil price fluctuation, exchange 
rates and income per capita (Chen et al. 1986; Butt et al. 2010; Oskenbayev et al. 2011). 
There is no standard set of variables that is used with APT, but it is rather a theoretical 
tool of understanding stock prices and the macroeconomic market equilibrium. After the 
expected return for a stock at the end of a specific period has been calculated with APT 
model, the actual stock price can be discounted with the rate that the model implies. 
Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is another pricing model, that can be seen as a 
special case of APT, although CAPM was initiated a few years before APT. Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) all independently researched the market 
equilibrium and the pricing of risky assets and came to very similar conclusion about 
capital asset pricing model. According to CAPM, the expected return of a stock i 
consists of two elements: risk free rate of return (rf) and stock-specific risk premium. 
Stock-specific risk premium correlates with market risk premium (rm – rf ) according to 
beta (βi) coefficient: 
 ! !! = !! + !!(!! − !!) (4)  
As it is easy to see, CAPM is basically APT with only one systematic factor: market 
risk premium. CAPM theory validity has many strong assumptions such as investors 
needing to have the same opinions about future asset values, they are rational, risk-
aversive and broadly diversified with ability to take a long or short position of any size 
in any stock without transaction costs (Black 1972). Stock price is then discounted for a 
specific period with the rate that CAPM model implies. Regardless of the limitations 
CAPM is widely used for stock price valuation because of its relative simplicity to APT 
combined with results that are close enough to reality. 
CAPM was later found to be insufficient in explaining stock returns in some situations. 
To improve the explaining power of CAPM, Fama & French (1992) added two more 
company specific factors to the model to describe the stock returns: market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratio1. The factors are derived from an observation 
that companies with low market capitalization or high book-to-market ratio (also known 
as value stocks) systematically tend to perform better. The significance of these factors 
change over time, therefore the latest calculated values can be found on French’s 
website (French 2011). In a big dimensional study with 425 billion dollar total assets 
under examination, single-factor CAPM explained 70% of the stock return variability 
and three-factor CAPM reached the explaining power of 96% (IFA 2011). Although 
explaining power of single factor CAPM is already on a high level, three-factor CAPM 
is significantly more accurate in explaining stock returns. 
                                                
1 Book-to-market ratio = Company’s total assets divided by company’s market capitalization 
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To summarize the presented stock valuation principles, the first mentioned stock 
valuation, earnings approach, is deriving from the own actions of the company in 
relation to competitors and macro-environment while the latter models, APT and 
CAPM, link the stock valuation to general market movements or other systemic factors. 
Both approaches are useful in rationalizing the use of event studies for valuation of 
order contracts, because the orders straightforwardly influence company’s earnings but 
on the other hand the stock price is highly tied to factors that simultaneously influence 
other stocks too. These views are therefore used hand in hand during this research. 
2.4. Orders as a contributing factor to company earnings 
So far it has been discussed how investors valuate dividends and earnings to stock 
prices, but the link to from total earnings to single orders is still to be clarified to reach 
the objective of justifying a financial response to order contract announcements. Besides 
the stock valuation approaches demonstrated earlier, the stock price movements can also 
be seen as an aggregate of changing company specific financial variables also called 
fundamentals. These fundamentals include for example inventory, R&D expenditure, 
labor force and order backlog. (Lev & Thiagarajan 1993) The search for fundamentals 
has continued for decades, but no standard set of fundamentals can be identified because 
they are in many cases industry specific or even company specific. 
When a fundamental can be used to forecast the future success of a company, it is called 
a leading indicator. Leading indicators are not necessarily financial measures, but a 
wide range of figures describing company’s actions. Order backlog is generally seen as 
a leading indicator for the earnings of the following period, usually year (Lev & 
Thiagarajan 1993; Rajgopal et al. 2003). Other researches of leading indicators have 
included for example sulfur dioxide emissions (Hughes 2000), customer satisfaction 
(Ittner & Larcker 1998) and number of patents (Deng et al. 1999). A good example of 
the explaining power of untraditional nonfinancial leading indicators is a study by Amir 
and Lev (1996) where the market values of cellular companies were compared to 
traditional financial figures (such as earnings and cash flows) and to nonfinancial 
indicators (such as the population of cellular service area and the market penetration). In 
the study the nonfinancial indicators had higher value-relevance than traditional 
financial indicators which clearly shows the ability of investors to value a wide scale of 
indirect factors contributing to company success. 
Investors do consider order backlog as a leading indicator, but how strong is the effect 
of backlog as an indicator? A study by Rajgopal et al. (2003) investigated if stock 
market fully appreciates leading indicators of future earnings. Order backlog was 
selected as the leading indicator under analysis because its definition is quite 
standardized, it is widely disclosed, dollar denominated and cross-sectionally 
comparable across many industries. The sample data was very broad, representing 3170 
firms with almost 22 000 firm-year observations of order backlog. The results showed 
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that order backlog is definitely a contributing factor to stock valuation. In fact, the 
research indicates that the investors are overly optimistic about order backlog if 
compared to cross-sectional association between order backlog and future earnings. The 
reason for over-valuing order backlogs is further probed in the article, and one potential 
explanation could be that equity analysts include backlog information in their earnings 
forecasts, but investors still value backlogs on top of analyst forecasts. Therefore the 
backlog is counted twice by many investors and the role of order backlog becomes 
exaggerated.  
The contribution of order backlog to stock valuation is explicit, but the relation can be 
explained more thoroughly. In addition to finding twelve fundamental factors Lev & 
Thiagarajan (1993) conditioned the factors on macroeconomic variables aiming to find 
different emphasis of the factors depending on the macroeconomic situation. Three 
variables were used: inflation rate, annual GNP (gross national product) change and 
annual change in the level of business inventories (all figures are from USA). Order 
backlog is valued as expected: during times of high inflation order backlog includes a 
strong inflationary component which lowers the future real sales growth and diminishes 
the value of order backlog. Vice versa, the same size of order backlog during low-
inflation years gives a stronger signal of real future performance, when inflationary 
component is not lowering the expected future profits. Differences in GNP growth did 
not show any relation to the signaling strength of order backlog. Interestingly, high 
inventory growth years showed higher appreciation of order backlog than low inventory 
growth years. Authors speculate the effect by stating that during high inventory growth 
years investors expect more future business and if the company fails to achieve it, 
negative reaction is stronger than during low inventory growth years. 
One more step associating stock reaction to company earnings and stock reaction to 
single orders is the link between company’s order backlog and winning single orders. 
Rather surprisingly, only one event study about winning order contracts was found in 
broad literature review. Alexander (1993) used five cases of major contract awards in 
defense industry to examine the leakage of insider information. Despite some 
methodological weaknesses, for example uncontrolled confounding events, the study 
shows significant abnormal returns (even 58,3%) after or before order contract is 
announced. It has to be noted though, that the role of examined orders for the focal 
defense technology companies was also huge, contributing 20-45 percent of their yearly 
revenue. The order contracts in this research are not so influential to the companies in 
focus, representing a maximum of 25 percent of yearly revenue. 
2.5. The expectations of markets 
The whole nature of markets can be described with a few divergent theories which in 
turn can strongly affect the event study results. Neoclassical economical interpretation is 
not just a theory, but a metatheory that sets implicit conditions and perceptions on 
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which economic theories are built. It has three fundamental assumptions according to 
Weinstraub (2007): 
1) People have rational preferences among outcomes 
2) Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits 
3) People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information 
If neoclassical principles are reflected to receiving order contracts, it means that signing 
every contract is made rationally with reasoned profit maximization in mind. Declining 
from projects without rational reason does not fit the neoclassical view. Irrational 
reasons in neoclassical interpretation could be for example favoring pet projects of a 
decision maker or choosing a particular project over others because of other personal 
preferences. If we assume that investors interpret world through neoclassical 
assumptions, investors would not weigh any implicit information about the contract but 
they would believe that every contract has a positive influence to company profits and 
therefore stock price. Neoclassical interpretation simplifies the actions of companies to 
be always profitable, which is a very strong assumption. 
Differing from the neoclassical view is the rational expectations approach to economics 
which was coined by Muth (1961). The rational expectations theory assumes that each 
individual investor has his/her own rational expectations about stock prices and even if 
the individual estimate contains errors, large amount of individual investors makes the 
expectation correct on average, in other words no systematical error arises. This 
approach can be seen parallel with the strong form of efficient market hypothesis: the 
market prices stocks always correctly, but in this case not because all information is 
public, but because average of expectations implicitly includes all information, even the 
unpublished part of it. 
The literature review of efficient market hypothesis showed that strong form of efficient 
markets doesn’t apply in real markets. Same conclusion can therefore be done for full 
application of rational expectations approach. But if the approach is applied in a smaller 
scale than whole markets, it might change the outcomes of event study radically. The 
event study of order contracts is fundamentally based on the unexpected deviation from 
forecasted order backlog, so if we assume that order backlog forecast is based on the 
rational expected approach and therefore absolutely correct, anything unexpected is not 
possible and event study produces no abnormal returns because no deviation occurs 
when new information about contracts is released to markets. 
Third fundamental approach that can be reflected to shareholder reaction of company 
events is the myopic approach. Kurz (cited in Samuel 2000) defines myopic decision 
making as an activity that ignores decision substitution possibilities arising from long-
term business environment changes whereas nonmyopic decision making considers 
possibilities through the entire relevant time period. Therefore in myopic decision 
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making near-term goals are emphasized at the expense of long-term goals. Shareholder 
myopia is usually referred in articles when the reaction to long-term investments is 
being researched. If shareholders are myopic, they emphasize immediate effects of a 
company action instead of seeing the full long-term effect. This has been claimed to 
cause negative stock reactions to decisions that have positive overall net present value 
or that are otherwise measurably profitable. For example in a paper by Humphery-
Jenner (2010) stock reactions to IT-related mergers and acquisitions were negative 
although the acquisitions were improving operations on average. Same kind of results 
were achieved in a study, where capital expenditure projects were categorized into 
immediate cash generating projects, non-immediate cash generating projects and joint 
venture related projects: although non-immediate cash-generating expenditures were not 
penalized with negative stock reaction as in Humphery-Jenner’s (2010) research, they 
didn’t cause any positive reaction either (Burton et al. 1999). The result can be 
explained with shareholder myopia or with the rational expectations theory. 
Reflecting shareholder myopia on the subject of this thesis is not very essential. The 
projects related to received order contracts can last for months or even years, but from 
the shareholder point of view they are easily seen as immediate cash generators and 
most certainly not long-term expenditures. Negative effect of shareholder myopia is 
therefore far-fetched, but myopia could affect the stock reaction the other way around. 
If myopic approach is applied to interpretation of order contract stock reactions, it could 
mean that shareholders are not able to see implicit value of special contracts such as 
conquering new markets, signing the first commercial contract of new technology or 
getting a contract that implies for further contracts. 
2.6. Summarizing the financial reaction to awarded order 
contracts 
The theoretical background presented in chapters 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 is summarized in 
Figure 1 to represent the whole pattern of explaining theories and factors affecting the 
outcome of this study. It starts the logical path from the notion of stock price and ends 
in the stock price reaction to order contracts. 
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Figure 1. The outline of theory rationalizing financial reaction to awarded order 
contracts 
The other stock valuation principles introduced in chapter 2.3 (APT and CAPM), which 
are based on arbitrage free markets, are omitted from the figure but it is still important 
to bear in mind that those approaches are valid at the same time. Essentially, under the 
market-based valuation principles the above process is implicitly done to every 
company and the market-based valuation is then applied to find the right balance of 
reaction between the companies. This approach will be used later in discussing the 
notion of “normal” returns of a company. In Figure 1, the market efficiency link 
between order backlog and single order depicts semi-strong form of market efficiency 
where stock price includes all past information and it reacts instantly to new information 
but it doesn’t reflect insider information. Thus, in this case stock price includes past 
values of order backlog and forecasts of order backlog and it reacts to significant 
changes to the backlog but it doesn’t include insider information about future contracts. 
Another noteworthy detail about the figure is the filtration of stock price reaction 
through three economic approaches. Even though the three approaches are parallel, they 
are not exclusive, so a part of order contracts could fall under the rational expectations 
approach producing no results, another part of order contracts could be interpreted 
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neoclassically with straightforward economic result and shareholder reaction while all 
the contracts could include long-term benefits or disadvantages not taken into account 
because of shareholder myopia. 
2.7. Main hypotheses 
The outlining of a theory that explains the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns 
is listed as a sub-objective of step 9 in the event study process proposed by McWilliams 
and Siegel (1997), but to keep the theoretical background as whole the cross-sectional 
variation and the hypotheses linked to it are presented in this chapter. The results of the 
second step, outline of the general theory, are also included in the hypotheses 
formulation. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) emphasize that if a researcher has outlined 
cross-sectional variation in the theory, the predictions should be tested with regression. 
Another type of more detailed analysis is to divide the initial sample into subsamples 
with some common characteristic. 
Firstly, the result of this research may be that no statistically significant abnormal 
returns linked to announcements of received order contracts occurs. There are many 
reasons for that, including: 1) rational expectations of the markets and the company 
actions, thus single contracts are continuously calculated to stock price 2) leakage of 
information prior to event window, thus not being able to capture the abnormal returns 
with the time periods used and 3) abnormal returns occur but they are too small to be 
captured with the method. Based on these arguments, a null hypothesis is formed:  
Null hypothesis: There is no stock market reaction to announcements of 
received company order contracts. 
The null hypothesis is important for the testability of other hypotheses. All the 
hypotheses are tested against null hypothesis with statistical methods to show the power 
of the results for rejecting the null hypothesis. If the evidence against null hypothesis is 
not strong enough, the null hypothesis is failed to reject. Null hypothesis cannot be 
proven, so if the null hypothesis is failed to reject, it doesn’t necessarily mean that there 
is no stock market reaction to announcements of awarded order contracts. Instead, it 
shows that the reaction is not found with this particular research design. 
The main hypothesis for this study is the opposite of null hypothesis. The theory 
outlining the main hypothesis is summarized in chapter 2.6. 
Hypothesis 1: Investors positively react to the announcements of order 
contracts. 
Hypothesis 1 seeks to answer the second research objective: “Define the general stock 
market reaction to announced order contracts”. A direction of the effect is added based 
on theory review. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) stress the importance of predicting the 
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direction of the stock price effect a priori and gives examples of weakly explained 
abnormal returns in some studies. These studies have presented the direction of the 
effect ambiguously, such as stating “we believed that such reactions will generally be 
negative, but they could be positive or neutral” (Worrell et al. 1991, p.638). Leaving the 
theory open in the building phase can easily lead to unexplained abnormal returns as the 
results are presented. 
Four additional hypotheses are seeking for achieving research objectives 2a and 2b. 
Hypothesis 2 compares the average abnormal returns of the two case companies. The 
basis for the direction of the economic effect of hypothesis 2 derives from the theory 
summarization (Figure 1). If we assume that the economic approach of the investors is 
the same in both companies, dividend irrelevancy applies and the average size of 
received orders is controlled, there are two systematical factors that are left to make a 
difference different stock price reaction between the companies: the portion of order 
value contributing to company earnings and the market efficiency level, or, in other 
words the newness of information to the market. The company-level relation of order 
size and earnings contribution can be derived from the net income percentage. A higher 
(lower) net income level means that a larger (smaller) amount of order value goes to the 
shareholders resulting in higher (lower) stock price effect. The other factor, leakage of 
information, is hard to control, and it can be very significant factor compared to effect 
calculated by net income, thus possibly explaining results that could diverge from the 
results predicted by the net income percentage. Theoretically, the value of the capital 
transferred to shareholders per contract announcement can be calculated by multiplying 
the order contract value by net income percentage. For example, with a net income level 
of 10 percent, a 100 million euro contract would result in 10 million euro capital 
transfer to shareholders. In like manner, if the order-specific value is changed to average 
order contract value and average net income level, the average capital transfer per 
contract of a certain time period is possible to calculate. 
Hypothesis 2: Stock price reaction to announced order contract is stronger 
(weaker) in a company with a higher (lower) net income percentage. 
In hypothesis 2 the value of order contracts is controlled, but if the value of order 
contract is changed into independent variable, the correlation of abnormal return and 
order contract value is possible to examine. A more (less) valuable contract is expected 
to result in a greater (smaller) stock price effect, because the amount of capital 
transferred to shareholders is larger (smaller), formulating third hypothesis. The same 
proportion of contract value is expected to be transferred to shareholders not depending 
on the size of the contract, so the correlation is anticipated to be linear. 
Hypothesis 3: The positive abnormal return reaction is correlated with the value 
of the order contract. 
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Previous hypotheses concern the general or company-level stock price reactions. To 
deepen the analysis further, the effect of internal differences in companies is 
hypothesized. Comparison of sales and earnings of internal business areas can reveal 
different EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) percentages between business areas. 
Again, higher (lower) EBIT predicts higher (lower) stock price effect. An example to 
describe the logic: business area A with 10 percent EBIT and business area B with 20 
percent EBIT both sign a contract of the same value. Theoretically, investors should 
appreciate the contract of business area B twice as much as business area A, because the 
amount of capital transferred to shareholders is two times as large. Compared to second 
hypothesis, where euro denominated values can be estimated, the absolute values cannot 
be compared in this case, because after EBIT there are financial items, such as corporate 
tax, that are deducted from the capital that eventually is transferred to shareholders. 
However, the comparison of absolute values is not essential when examining internal 
differences of companies. 
Hypothesis 4: The stock price reaction is affected by the operating margin of 
the business area to which the received contract belongs. 
The last hypothesis tests the investors’ ability to incorporate macroeconomic variables 
into their reaction of order contracts. Lev & Thiagarajan (1993) found the inflation level 
to be a fundamental factor that affects how order backlogs are valued in company stock 
prices. The fifth hypothesis goes a step further, predicting that besides size of order 
backlog, the effect of inflation to single order valuation is found. 
Hypothesis 5: The stock price reaction includes the effect of current inflation: 
during times of high inflation the order contracts are not valued as much as 
during low inflation. 
These five hypotheses are tested against null hypothesis to reach the second research 
objective and its subobjectives. In the hypothesis formation the pitfalls drafted by 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) are noted by building the foundations of hypothesis 
solidly to the theory. 
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3. METHODOLOGICAL VARIATION OF EVENT 
STUDIES 
Building a theoretically solid base to justify the general financial reaction and the 
content of hypotheses is an integral part of well-founded event study research, but 
equally important is to select the methodological details of event study to achieve a 
valid and reliable study. Going back to the event study implementation procedure 
suggested by McWilliams and Siegel (1997), the research design details are covered in 
steps 3 to 9. These steps are described in the article briefly, so in this chapter the 
significance of each step and methodological options for the different parts is discussed. 
3.1. Selecting sample companies and events 
The sample companies and their events construct the data set of an event study and thus 
form the empirical base for the whole study. Naturally, the selection of sample is a 
crucial part which defines many other aspects of the study. Some important details to 
consider when choosing the sample are sample size, sample representativeness and 
sample accuracy. Sample size is probably the most discussed aspect in event study 
literature. Brown and Warner (1985) note that small sample sizes, meaning less than 50 
companies, cause inaccuracy to statistical significance analysis, because stock returns of 
a single company are not normally distributed but show some skewness and kurtosis. To 
control the non-normality McWilliams and Siegel (1997) suggest additional 
significance analysis methods, if sample size is less than 30 companies. However, it 
should be noted that small sample size itself does not skew the actual abnormal return 
results but only the stated significance levels. Another advantage of large sample size is 
the increased power of detecting abnormal returns. MacKinlay (1997) presents tabulated 
and graphed information of the sample size related to the power of rejecting null 
hypothesis, and it is a good reference to the initial stages of sample planning. 
Sample representativeness means the extent of how the sample represents the group of 
which it claims to represent. Not many event studies discuss the representativeness of 
their sample, and the descriptions vary a lot. Becker and Olson (1986, p.430) state their 
sample of employee strikes in U.S. to be “generally representative of U.S. 
manufacturing” without further explanation. Lee (1997) compares the collected sample 
to another sample of the same subject and comes to a conclusion that representativeness 
of Japanese corporate layoffs between 1990 and 1994 is achieved. Chaney et al. (1991) 
takes the analysis a bit further by acknowledging that their product announcement 
sample collected from Wall Street Journal is not representative of all new products, but 
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it is rather a sample of “significant” products filtered through Wall Street Journal 
reporting bias. Indeed, the source of sample events can bring a strong bias and it is 
always wise to discuss about sample representativeness, if the data is not collected from 
a primary source. 
Sample accuracy is not an established notion in event study theory, but in here it means 
at least two things: the certainty of the moment when a sample event occurred and the 
trading frequency of a sample security. For a large multinational corporation with a lot 
of analyst coverage the issue of accuracy is probably not a problem, because the events 
are covered in business media quickly. Still, a mistake in the choice of source medium 
can bring inaccuracy to the identification of correct event day or time, for example if a 
magazine is not published on a certain weekday, the reporting of events occurring on 
those days can lag. The trading frequency of a security brings inaccuracy to the results if 
trading is sparse compared to the resolution of examination. Conducting event studies 
on a small stock exchange with thinly traded stocks is under analysis by Bartholdy et al. 
(2007) and the conclusions show that event studies are possible with thinly traded 
stocks, but they need some special methodological solutions to be performed validly. 
The main points of the results state that minimum of 25 events is necessary to achieve 
significant results, thinly traded stocks need trade to trade return adjustments, detecting 
abnormal performance of less than 1 percent is generally not expected, and 
nonparametric significance tests perform better than parametric tests. 
When the sample is built, it is practical to summarize characteristics of the sample, such 
as market capitalization, industry representation and distribution of the events through 
time (MacKinlay 1997). The internal dynamics of the sample and any potential biases 
are useful to note. One pitfall of the sample dynamics can be ignoring the effect of 
overlapping events across the sample. A good example of overlapping is a study of 
automobile recalls (Jarrell & Peltzman 1985). A reexamination of the research by 
Hoffer et al. (1988) revealed that a recall by one manufacturer affected the stock price 
of another manufacturer. Thus, the sample events of one company were contaminating 
the data of other company. Forgetting this kind of dynamism in the sample could lead to 
serious distortion in the results. 
3.2. Length of the event window 
The fourth step in the event study procedure is defining the length of event window. 
Besides the actual event window there are some established notions of different time 
frames surrounding events in event studies. These time frames include estimation 
window, pre-event window, event window and post-event window (for example 
Henderson 1990; MacKinlay 1997). Figure 2 shows the positioning of typical time 
windows in relation to each other. 
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Figure 2. Time line for an event study (MacKinlay 1997) 
In event studies time is usually kept relative to the moment of the event, marked with 
t=0. Event window usually includes at least t=0, and it is surrounding t=0 symmetrically 
or asymmetrically. Furthest in the past is the estimation window. It is used to estimate 
the parameters that are included in calculation of “the normal performance” of a stock. 
Between estimation window and event window is pre-event window. It is used to 
separate the possible information leakage that could contaminate the estimation window 
(see for example Klassen & McLaughlin 1996). Stock prices from the pre-event 
window are therefore omitted from the estimation window and also from the event 
window. Stock returns of the post-event window are sometimes included in the 
estimation window. (MacKinlay 1997) This is especially useful if the event window is 
long and the fundamentals of the company or the industry and consequently the 
estimation parameters might have changed during the event window.  
Selecting the proper length of the event window is a two-sided question. McWilliams 
and Siegel (1997) advice to justify the length of the event window if it exceeds two 
days. The positioning of event window depends on the level of unexpectedness of the 
selected event. A good example of unanticipated event is a sudden natural catastrophe 
such as earthquake. No one could have had the information content of the event before 
the earthquake, so the event window is in that case justified to begin from the moment 
when the earthquake occurred. In contrast, an event can be considered somewhat 
anticipated if it is insider information that could leak outside before the actual 
announcement is given to markets. Other source for anticipation could be an event that 
“is just bound to happen”, for example firing a CEO that has done something 
controversial and is not able to defend his position. Each event study has to be analyzed 
for the possibility of event expectedness and adjust the event window considering the 
leakage or expectedness of information. This can mean setting the event window to start 
as early as months before t=0 (eg. Lubatkin 1987; Worrell et al. 1991). Besides 
unintentional information leakage, identifying the exact event time can be a problem. 
The issue is very clear if the information source of events is a daily newspaper. When 
an announcement is released to markets, it is usually in the newspapers one day after the 
announcement, but in special cases it could last two days or more. Anyhow, newspaper 
as the source for event timing is not very contemporary method thus is should not 
generally be used if better sources are available because of the timing problem. 
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Nowadays good sources for company events are for example the press release archives 
of stock exchanges or electronic business newswire services. As listed companies in 
most countries are obligated by the law to notice stock exchanges of their major news in 
timely fashion, the time stamps in stock exchange releases are the primary sources of 
announcements and the exact time of announcement can be tracked to the second when 
announcement was made. Business newswire services are another source for accurately 
time stamped events as they work often as mediators between a company and stock 
exchange (for example Business Wire 2011). Carefulness must be observed if using 
newswires as a source, though, as newswires can also gather news from other sources 
with a lag of several hours to days. Generally speaking, the more ambiguity in 
identifying the actual event time, the wider the event window has to be to certainly 
capture the actual event. 
The reason why McWilliams and Siegel (1997) suggests avoiding longer event 
windows (if they are not necessary) is because longer event windows create at least two 
methodological problems. The statistical power of the event study technique weakens 
with longer event windows. Brown and Warner (1985) noticed significant change in 
rejection percentage of null hypothesis between the event window lengths of one day 
and eleven days. Another issue about longer event windows is controlling the 
confounding events. Confounding events are other economically significant events that 
are happening to the company during event window (McWilliams & Siegel 1997). 
Obviously, longer event windows have a higher possibility of containing confounding 
events thus requiring additional methods to control the effect of those events. The 
methods for that purpose are discussed more in next chapter. 
To give a general idea of what kind of event windows are use in past researches of 
various event types, the following list of past event study researches is gathered from 
renowned business and financing related journals published between 1976 and 2008. It 
is not supposed to be a complete list of past important event studies, but rather a 
glimpse to what kind of events have already been studied with what research design 
parameters. The publishing years and subjects are selected to cover a wide range of 
event studies. 
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Table 2. Past event studies (continued) 
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Table 2. Past event studies (continued) 
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Table 2. Past event studies (continued) 
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As Table 1 shows, event windows range from minutes to years so everything in between 
is possible. More important is that the other details of event study research design must 
be fitted to match the requirements of event window length. For example in the research 
by Busse And Green (2002), where event analysis timeframe resolution is as small as 
0,25 minutes, the statistical significance has to be determined with a nonparametric 
bootstrap algorithm because intraday returns are not normally distributed, which is the 
requirement for parametric significance tests. Bootstrap algorithms are elaborated later 
in chapter 3.5. In the other end, long-range event studies (event window more than 12 
months) are sensitive to different aspects of event study. In contrast to short-range event 
studies, adjustment of risk level is critical in calculation of abnormal returns in long-
range event studies. Even 50 percent misestimation of beta risk level is not very 
significant in short-range studies as average daily expected returns of stocks are only 
about 0,05 percent. Conversely, when event window is lengthened to months, the 50 
percent misestimation is a significant error source. (Kothari & Warner 2007) In short 
event windows the risk level can also be expected to be constant during the event 
window, but in long event windows it is reasonable to calculate the sliding average of 
risk during the event period. 
Among the studies listed above there are many studies that include multiple event 
windows. In many cases the multiple event windows serve different purpose. For 
example in the research by Abowd et al. (1990) the event window from -10 to -3 days 
examines the possible leakage of information but the main focus is in the event window 
from -2 to +2 days. Same approach is used by Davidson and Wallace (1988) where one 
event window is -5 to -2 days but the main results are derived from event windows of -
10 to +10 days and -1 to +1 day. Table 1 also shows how the day after t=0 is usually 
included in the event window because the timing of announcements is hard to specify 
and control. Especially today’s international business environment can cause difficulties 
in identifying t=0: let’s say a notable announcement of a multinational company’s Asian 
operations is given during active stock trading hours in Asia, but the announcement 
concerns a stock which is listed in a European stock exchange where trading hours have 
already ended at the time of the announcement. In that case the actual stock price effect 
would realize at the time when the stock exchange is reopened on the next day in 
Europe, assuming there is no prior information leakage. Therefore it can be risky to 
exclude day t+1 from the event window. 
Studies that have chosen event windows of several months in length have some 
common characteristics. The covered events are often a culmination point of a long-
lasting negative or positive progression. Good examples are the corporate layoff studies 
by Chen et al. (2001), Worrell et al. (1991) and Hillier et al. (2007) or employee strike 
study by Greer et al. (1980). The long event windows are relevant in those studies to 
examine how investors perceive the atmosphere of a company before the announcement 
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of a significant event, which makes the progression explicit. Longer event windows 
would be irrelevant for events such as sudden death in top management or natural 
catastrophe, where there are no signs of upcoming event beforehand. Nonetheless, these 
studies usually include also a shorter event window to compare the magnitude of long-
term reaction and announcement reaction. 
Besides setting the proper length of the actual event window, the length of estimation 
window must be set too. The function of estimation window is to estimate parameters of 
the model which is used to calculate normal returns of the stock and it does not include 
the actual event time. Some return models, such as market-adjusted model, do not use 
any estimation window. The justification for estimation window length is rarely 
discussed in researches, but the established average length is around 100 to 180 days 
(for example Kelm et al. 1995; Nayyar 1995; McGuire & Dilts 2008). A short 
estimation window can cause misestimation to the parameters, because single events 
during the estimation window influence the parameters too much. (Abowd et al. 1990; 
MacKinlay 1997) In the other end, too long estimation windows do not capture the 
fluctuation of normal return model parameters over time. The fundamentals of a stock 
or a whole market can change thus making a one-year-average of parameters less 
accurate than six-month-average. Another point against long estimation window is the 
effect of overlapping. If the analyzed events are close to each other, the event estimation 
windows are probably overlapping other events, causing possible estimation errors. 
Poon et al. (2001) took overlapping estimation windows into account by using only 50-
day estimation window but 100-day and 250-day estimation windows were also tested 
to verify the robustness of results despite the estimation window length. All in all, the 
chosen estimation window length must be a compromise between the disadvantages and 
benefits of long and short estimation windows. 
Summarizing the meaning of different time frames around an event in event studies, the 
proper length of the event window can be anything between years and minutes, but the 
most essential matter is to justify the usage of selected event window. A good question 
to pose yourself is “How long before or after t=0 the information content of the event 
could influence the stock price?” The research objective also influences the appropriate 
event window length: is the research seeking for long-term awareness of investors about 
a subject or only the instant effect of an event. The downsides of especially short or 
long event windows should be compensated with other research design details for 
example seeking higher statistical significance for longer event windows by choosing 
the correct sample quantity and quality. 
3.3. Confounding events 
The event study procedure continues from setting the event window to the control of 
confounding events. In the search for abnormal returns of an event it is assumed that the 
effect of the event has been isolated from the effects of other events. These other events 
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are called confounding or contaminating events. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) point 
out how researchers do not seem to be very perceptive of the issue about confounding 
events. One reason for that could be the ambiguity of confounding events, in particular 
what events should be considered confounding and what should not. Other reason is the 
impact to sample size when rejecting events with confounding events. This reason is 
highlighted in a research by Meznar et al. (1994, p.1639): “Although we would have 
preferred a larger protection window around our events, such an increase would have 
eliminated so many events from the pool that the generalizability of the study would 
have been seriously impaired.” 
The following examples of controlling confounding events are gathered from the 
articles presented in Table 1. Many of the articles do not mention anything about 
confounding or contaminating events. This is especially alarming in studies with short 
event windows and small sample sizes as even one confounding event could influence 
the results significantly. For instance a study by Singh and Montgomery (1987) has an 
overall sample size of 77 events with smallest subsample being 37 events, but no 
identification of confounding events is done. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) replicated 
two CSR related researches made in 1994 and 1995 searching for confounding events 
that were ignored in the original researches and found out that the original sample of 
106 events contained 367 confounding events during the longest event windows used in 
the researches. After filtering events that had confounding events and rerunning the 
abnormal return calculations, the results were no longer significant, giving a strong 
statement for better control of confounding events. Another cautionary example of 
carelessly controlled confounding events is a research by Adams et al. (1999) which has 
a sample size of 48 events with smallest subsample being 7 events. The main results are 
presented without clearing confounding events; although in the sensitivity analysis 
confounding events are noted, but for some unexplained reason only negative 
confounding events are excluded. The result of this sensitivity analysis is quite obvious: 
after dropping out events that included negative confounding events the analysis yielded 
“slightly more significant evidence of a stock price increase on the announcement day.” 
(Adams et al. 1999, p.600) 
When the controlling of confounding events is performed, the first step is to use a broad 
news source to identify any company-specific, possibly contaminating events during 
event windows. In practice it is a search through local business newspapers (in US, for 
example Wall Street Journal, New York Times and Business Week (McWilliams & 
Siegel 1997; Davidson III et al. 2002)) or lately the usage of aggregated news service 
such as Nexis (used by Nayyar 1995). The next step is to define which of the events that 
are found have the contaminating effect and which are insignificant to stock prices. The 
practice for classifying confounding events has changed dramatically over time. 
Specifically in older studies the control for confounding events is not done at all or it is 
limited to a few types of events, for instance interim reports (Firth 1976). Greer (1980) 
examines the effect of strikes and controls only other strikes that occur during the event 
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window, similarly to a R&D related study of Kelm et al. (1995) where only other R&D 
events are regarded confounding. Many authors do not present the full list of 
confounding events checked in study, but only give some examples. These lists 
generally include events such as earnings announcements, dividend announcements, 
layoff announcements, mergers, secondary offerings and personnel changes (Woolridge 
& Snow 1990; Pilotte 1992; Tsetsekos & Gombola 1992; Clinebell & Clinebell 1994). 
One study refers only to “major events” (Hall & Rieck 1998) and one study lists other 
specific elimination criterion such as the terrorist attack on 11th September 2001 
(McGuire & Dilts 2008). McWilliams and Siegel (1997) list thirteen event types that 
they assume to be confounding based on earlier event studies: 
1) Restructuring / Divestiture 
2) Price changes 
3) New products 
4) Dividend / Earnings announcement 
5) Joint venture formation 
6) Acquisition activity 
7) Litigation / Labor unrest 
8) Major executive changes 
9) Major initiatives by rivals 
10) Forecasted changes in earnings or sales 
11) Layoffs 
12) Debt or equity related event 
13) Contract awards 
The list is extensive but it could still be expanded with many of the event types included 
in Table 1. In essence if it is not certain that an event is insignificant, the safer bet is to 
assume that it is confounding. Studies by Worrell et al. (1997) and Nayaar (1995) have 
taken a strict policy with confounding events, disqualifying events from the sample in 
case of any other events. For the purpose of credibility and replicability of a study, the 
full listing of confounding event types acknowledged in the particular study is useful. 
Another issue is setting the time frame in which confounding events are controlled. A 
natural choice would be the length of the event window, but different approaches are 
also found. Probably trying to avoid too small sample size Tsetsekos & Gombola (1992) 
only disqualify events that have confounding events between -5 to +5 days despite the 
detail that their longest event window is from -60 to +60 days. Likewise, Worrell et al. 
(1991) control only the actual event day in spite of the longest event window being -90 
to +90 days and Woolridge & Snow (1990) check the confounding events from -1 to +1 
days against the longest event window of -10 to +1 days. To avoid confusion it is 
therefore essential to precisely mention if the confounding events are not controlled for 
the whole event window. 
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The usual handling of events with confounding events is to fully ignore them from the 
event study sample. If there is ambiguity in the contaminating effect of certain event 
types, other option would be to do a sensitivity analysis by treating the sample with 
confounding events and without confounding events separately. Klassen and 
McLaughlin (1996) use this kind of approach, presenting statistics and results of full 
sample and cleaned sample in parallel throughout the event study. 
Based on the findings from past literature the key points of controlling confounding 
events are: 
1) Using a broad news source to find company-specific events that occur during 
the examined time period 
2) Identifying events that are confounding in the particular study and listing the 
types of confounding events 
3) Setting the time frame where confounding events are controlled, preferably 
same as event window 
4) Either fully removing events with confounding events from the sample or 
treating full sample and cleaned sample separately 
5) Reporting the procedure with confounding events in a research properly 
3.4. Calculating abnormal returns 
The importance of the sixth step in the event study procedure cannot be underlined too 
much because the calculation of abnormal returns is included in the basic definition of 
event studies. The proceeding steps have essentially been selecting and preparing the 
sample for calculation of abnormal returns and the following steps are detailed analysis 
of calculated abnormal returns, so the whole procedure can be seen to converge in this 
step. The calculation of abnormal returns begins by defining how to calculate returns in 
general. As Henderson (1990) mentions, most event studies do not mention how the 
calculation of returns is done, although it also seems not to make considerable 
difference. There are two main methods of calculating a return for single period: 
arithmetic return and continuously compounded (or logarithmic) return. Arithmetic 
return is simply the percentage of change between the initial value of an investment (Vi) 
and the final value of an investment (Vf): 
 !!"#$! = !! − !!!!  (5)  
Continuously compounded return is the logarithmic value of the ratio between Vf and Vi: 
 !!"# = ln !!!!  (6)  
  35
Continuously compounded return calculation is used in the most part of event studies as 
it has a few advantages over arithmetic returns. The return distribution normality is 
improved when using logarithmic returns and negative values are transformed to 
positive. Converting daily values to longer time periods is also easier with logarithmic 
return calculation. (Henderson 1990) 
The abnormal return measures the stock market’s reaction to new information, so to 
calculate the abnormal returns of a stock, we need to determine normal returns i.e. what 
would the stock returns have been without the release of new information. So, for 
company i and event period τ the abnormal return ARiτ is 
 !"!" = !!" − ! !!" !!  (7)  
where Riτ is the actual perceived return and E(Riτ│Xτ) is the expected normal return for 
the same period with conditioning information Xτ for the normal return model. 
(MacKinlay 1997) The actual returns are unambiguously retrieved from stock price 
information source thus the only choice left to researcher that is affecting the abnormal 
returns is the choice of normal return model. The various normal return models can be 
classified into three types: mean-adjusted return models, market-adjusted return models 
and conditional (or risk-adjusted) return models (Henderson 1990). If minor details 
between all return models are regarded, the total number of different models is much 
higher than three but this grouping combines the basic approaches into three types. 
Thus, each return model type can include many variations of the model that are close to 
each other. 
Mean-adjusted return model is one of the simplest return models used in event studies 
and it has no common variations. In mean-adjusted return model a constant is subtracted 
from the event period returns. The constant is the average return of the company during 
the estimation period. The expected normal return Riτ for asset i in period τ is 
 !!" = !! + !!" (8)  
where µi is the mean return during the estimation period and ζiτ is the disturbance term 
with an expected value of zero. (MacKinlay 1997) Combined with the abnormal return 
formula (7) the mean-adjusted abnormal return for asset i in period τ is 
 !"!" = !!" − !! + !!" (9)  
Although this model is very straightforward, it generates very similar returns compared 
to more advanced return models. Brown and Warner (1985) compare the abnormal 
detection performance of mean adjusted returns, market adjusted returns and market 
model returns and find out that the difference in detecting abnormal performance is only 
2-5 percentage points. On the contrary, in the simulation of abnormal return detection 
by Dyckman et al. (1984) mean-adjusted returns did not perform as well as market 
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model. Another possible error source for mean-adjusted return model is the general 
trend of market. Klein and Rosenfeld (1987) examined return residuals during 
downward and upward trends of market and found out significantly biased residuals. 
The problem gets worse if a change in market trend occurs just between the estimation 
period and the event period or if the stock has undergone a runup during the estimation 
period. For these reasons the usage of mean-adjusted returns must be supplied with a 
careful control of the abovementioned factors impacting the results. 
Market-adjusted return model is as straightforward as mean-adjusted return model. 
Because it has no estimation period, it can be used in situations where past stock data is 
unavailable, for instance in an initial public offering (Ritter 1991). Market-adjusted 
abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting the return of the market for the event 
period from the return of the stock for the same period. (Henderson 1990) In other 
words, the expected normal return Riτ for asset i in period τ is the same as return of the 
market Rmτ: 
 !!" = !!" (10)  
Combined with the basic abnormal return formula (7) the abnormal return for asset i in 
period τ according to market-adjusted return model is 
 !"!" = !!" − !!" (11)  
The abnormal return detection performance and bias of residuals of market-adjusted 
return model has been examined in a couple of studies with mixed results (Brown & 
Warner 1980; Dyckman et al. 1984; Klein & Rosenfeld 1987). Brown and Warner 
(1980) implied that the power of the model is equivalent to sophisticated market 
models, but Dyckman et al. (1984) found market-adjusted model to be weaker than 
other market models. Klein and Rosenfeld (1987) noticed the same weaknesses for 
market-adjusted return model than mean-adjusted return model: the upward and 
downward trends or stock run-ups create significant residuals biasing the results. Using 
market-adjusted returns is thus not encouraged except in the cases where estimation 
process is not possible. 
Conditional or risk-adjusted return models are a large collection of return models in 
which the risk level of stock is taken into account in return calculations. One of the 
earliest risk-adjustment methods is control portfolio risk-adjustment. In this method a 
portfolio of sample stocks is assembled with the condition that it has the same estimated 
risk level (or beta) than market portfolio. Then the return of the constructed portfolio is 
calculated. The abnormal returns are estimated by subtracting the market return from 
portfolio return. Brown and Warner (1980) examine the effectiveness of control 
portfolios and conclude that it is not as accurate as other methods. Henderson (1990) 
discusses wider usage of control portfolio adjustment method giving an example of 
industry portfolio that could serve as a control portfolio for an event company in the 
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same industry. In that case the excess return of an event would be the difference of 
returns between the event company and industry portfolio. Although the idea is logical, 
the control portfolio risk-adjustment has not gained much popularity, probably because 
many researchers were already strongly engaged in other methods (Henderson 1990) 
and because of the performance problems that portfolio weighing brings (Brown & 
Warner 1980). 
Another subcategory of risk-adjusted return models is regression models. Generally, in 
regression models some factors are regressed from the data and those factors are applied 
to calculation of excess returns. The estimation window has a big role in these methods 
because it is used to calculate the factor. The simplest regression model is the single-
index market model. It is sometimes referred simply as the market model (Chaney et al. 
1991; Kelm et al. 1995) or OLS market model (Brown & Warner 1985), but to separate 
it from multiple index models it is clearer to refer to it as single-index market model or 
SIMM. According to SIMM the normal return of a company is expected to correlate 
with the market return which adjusted with the company-specific beta (or market 
sensitivity level). Thus, the expected normal return Riτ for asset i in period τ is 
 !!" = !! + !!!!" + !!" (12)  
where αi is the intercept estimated from the regression of the estimation period, βi is the 
market sensitivity level estimated from the regression of the estimation period, Rmτ is the 
market return for period τ and εiτ is the error term with an expected value of zero. 
(Henderson 1990; MacKinlay 1997) Combined with formula (7), SIMM abnormal 
returns are 
 !!!" = !!" − (!! + !!!!" + !!") (13)  
and since the expected value of the error term εiτ is zero, all residuals of the subtraction 
is termed the abnormal return. Despite the relative simplicity of the single-index market 
model, it offers a significant improvement to mean-adjusted and market-adjusted return 
models (Brown & Warner 1985; MacKinlay 1997). In detail, market-adjusted return 
model can be seen as a restriction of SIMM with αi set to zero and βi set to one, but 
adding those factors to model cleans the portion of the stock return that comes from the 
variation of market return. This improves the detection ability of abnormal returns. 
(MacKinlay 1997) 
A bit more complex regression model is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
described already as a stock valuation principle in chapter 2.3. Based on CAPM, the 
expected normal return Riτ for asset i in period τ is 
 !!" = !!" 1− !! + !!!!" + !!" (14)  
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where Rfτ is risk-free rate of return during period τ, βi is the risk-level of the asset, Rmτ is 
the market return for period τ and εiτ is the error term with an expected value of zero. 
Beta-value is calculated by regressing Riτ on Rmτ in similar fashion as in the SIMM, but 
with the difference of subtracting risk-free rate of return from Riτ and Rmτ before the 
regression analysis. The above formula is essentially the same as CAPM stock valuation 
equation (4) but in this form it can be seen easier how CAPM is consistent with the 
SIMM if βi and Rfτ are stable. MacKinlay (1997) discusses the usage of CAPM in event 
studies and notes that it was a common method during 1970s, but later the anomalies 
found by researchers, such as Fama and French (1996), have implied that results 
achieved with CAPM could be sensitive to the restrictions of the model. The 
performance difference in event studies between SIMM and CAPM, in favor of CAPM, 
compared to the sensitivity problem is very small, so the usage of CAPM has almost 
discontinued. 
Adding more elements to the normal return calculations are the multiple index models. 
They are not a specific model, but a common name for regression models where more 
factors are added to improve the explaining power of normal return model. For instance 
industry factors are commonly used (for example Langetieg 1978; Sharpe 1970 and 
Sharpe et al. 1995 cited in MacKinlay 1997). Multiple index models are very analogous 
to arbitrage pricing theory, which is a stock price valuation method described earlier. A 
generic formula for multiple index model return calculation for asset i in period τ is 
 !!" = !! + !!!!" + !!"!!" +⋯+ !!" (15)  
where αi, βi, Rmτ and εiτ are as in the SIMM, and further sensitivities are added to the 
model with βxi and Rxτ (Henderson 1990). The two additional factors described in three-
factor CAPM (book-to-market ratio and market capitalization) are potential options for 
multiple index return models. The usage of multiple index models is a double-edged 
question. The gains of multiple index models are marginal compared to single index 
market model, because the market factor seems to explain most of the variation. The 
variance reduction is greatest in situations where the sample companies are alike or 
have common characteristics, so in those cases the usage of suitable additional 
sensitivity indices could be useful in relation to the resources that have to be put to 
building the index. Otherwise, the benefits of multiple index models are rather limited. 
(MacKinlay 1997) 
One important element of calculating abnormal returns is the measurement of 
independent variables. In mean-adjusted return-model the only independent variable is 
the mean of returns, and the options of return calculations were already discussed. In 
other models the market return Rmτ is an independent variable which has different 
options for its calculation. Market returns are based on changes in market indices, but 
the definition of the market and the index is an open question. As Bartholdy et al. 
(2007) note, most of the empirical data for event studies is coming from a single source: 
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the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), which includes data of US stocks 
and indices. For event studies of companies listed in US it is natural to choose an index 
from US markets, but for other countries or in multi-country setting the choice is not so 
clear. A straightforward choice would be to choose the stock market index of the market 
where the event company is listed, but exceptions for this could be if the company has 
most of its operations somewhere else, if the home country stock market is very small 
with a high variance or if the events involve companies in multiple countries. To answer 
the multi-country event study problems Park (2004) developed a world market model 
that considers the event company home market index return, world market index return 
and change in exchange rate as the components for the overall stock return. Examples 
for suitable world market indices are the EAFE (The Europe, Australia, Far East) index 
or FTSE (Financial Times Stock Exchange) World Index. According to Park (2004) the 
use of world market model resulted in less overestimation of abnormal returns than 
traditional market model in a case of events that involved companies in many countries. 
Besides the geographical choice of a market index, one stock market can present 
multiple indices. For instance the S&P500 index has three general versions: value-
weighted, equal-weighted and dividend index (Standard and Poor's Financial Services 
LLC 2011). In event study literature the difference of equal-weighted and value-
weighted indices has been analyzed in a couple of occasions. Value-weighted index has 
been seen to reflect the market performance most accurately, thus is should be used in 
event studies (Roll 1981; Ohlson & Rosenberg 1982). Interestingly, the usage of value 
weighted index results in higher percentage of falsely rejected null hypothesis than 
equally weighted index. In other words, equally weighted index detects abnormal 
returns more likely, but still it should not be used. 
All in all, the step of calculating abnormal returns does not go through the same pattern 
as there are dozens of methods, variables and data sources to use. Risk-adjusted 
regression models are dominating the event study literature and from the regression 
models SIMM is the most common model mainly because of its simplicity and 
robustness with different research design issues (Henderson 1990). Special situations 
such as unavailability of past data or multi-country setting require adaptation of the 
abnormal calculation methods. Similarly to the phases of setting event window lengths 
and controlling confounding events, documenting the exact procedure is essential. An 
assumption that only the name of the model will explicitly indicate abnormal return 
model details is obviously too bold. For example Meznar et al. (1994) describe the 
calculation quite vaguely as “calculating a regression line to fit the stock prices of the 
firm several months preceding the event date, with the overall performance of the stock 
market controlled”. In this case there is no mention of how many and what regression 
parameters are used and how the stock market is controlled. Describing the method in 
detail improves the credibility and replicability of the study. 
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Nothing prohibits a researcher from using multiple normal return models in a same 
research. This approach is used by Adams et al. (1999): the abnormal returns are 
calculated using mean-adjusted model, market-adjusted model and single-index market 
model. This way the robustness of different models in the particular study is checked. In 
multiple-model studies it is important to explain if models produce divergent results and 
validate which result is the most plausible. 
3.5. Reporting relevant test statistics  
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) defined step six as the step in which to compute 
abnormal returns and test their significance. In their seventh step the significance is 
tested more thoroughly with binomial Z or Wilcoxon test statistic. In this chapter both 
of these test phases are combined to describe the event study significance tests in 
general. Similarly to previous steps, the practice of statistical significance testing in 
event study literature is highly diverse. The eighth step of event study procedure is to 
use bootstrap methods and discuss impact of outliers if the event study sample is small. 
This conditional step is also discussed in this chapter. 
The division of significance analysis to sixth and seventh step is also a division between 
the major assumptions in event study result analysis: are the abnormal return distributed 
normally or not? In the sixth step McWilliams and Siegel (1997) are testing the 
significance with the normal distribution assumption. From the standardized cumulative 
abnormal returns the null hypothesis rejection probability can be calculated with 
methods demonstrated by Campbell et al. (1997, p.161). After the p-value is calculated, 
the researcher has to make a choice whether to use one-tailed or two-tailed test. Testing 
abnormal returns is usually done two-tailed, because both negative and positive 
abnormal returns are potential results (for example Klein & Rosenfeld 1987; Worrell et 
al. 1991; Adams et al. 1999). Bowman (1983) notes that if the direction of a stock effect 
is predicted, a one-tailed test would be suitable, but this hasn’t been followed much in 
researches, maybe because the directionality prediction is not certain and two-tailed test 
brings extra confidence to the results. 
Reporting two-tailed p-values for each abnormal return result is almost a standard, but it 
lacks the ability of identifying outliers that could skew the results. The OLS estimation 
method used in market parameter estimation is particularly sensitive to outliers, making 
the whole result sensitive to them. Small sample of companies and events increases the 
impact of outliers, so it becomes crucial to evaluate whether the results are skewed by 
outliers. Options for the treatment of outliers are either to remove them from the sample 
or to report nonparametric test statistics. Non-parametric test statistics do not require 
normal distribution of the data set, which makes them usable in small samples 
(McWilliams & Siegel 1997) 
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Non-parametric tests that have been used widely in event study include positive (or 
negative) proportion of sample size, binomial Z and Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Basically, they are examining the same sample characteristic but in a different depth. 
The statistic of positive proportion of sample size simply calculates how many of the 
individual abnormal return observations yield a positive result (Nayyar 1995; Klassen & 
McLaughlin 1996). Null hypothesis would mean that half of the abnormal return 
observations are positive and half are negative, or if the returns of a company are 
suspected not to be equally divided, the distribution can be determined from the 
estimation period (Lee 2001). Even this simple test can reveal new details of the 
sample: for example if a parametrically significant mean positive abnormal return is 
dominated by only a few large abnormal return observations on the positive side, but 
most of the observations are slightly on the negative side, the significance of the 
original result is disputed. Compared to proportion test, binomial Z test (or sign test) 
makes the simple positive (or negative) proportion statistic more quantitative. It relates 
the proportion of negative or positive returns to the sample size, giving a Z-value that is 
used to detect the statistical significance level of the analyzed proportion (McWilliams 
& Siegel 1997). Wilcoxon signed-rank test goes a step further: besides the sign of a 
single abnormal return observation Wilcoxon signed-rank test takes into account also 
the size of the abnormal return observation (Tsetsekos & Gombola 1992; Burton et al. 
1999). In the test the absolute values of abnormal returns are ranked with positive from 
lowest to highest, so the highest absolute abnormal return gets the same rank as the 
sample size is. After ranking the abnormal returns, the original positive or negative sign 
is re-attached to the rank and the sum of all ranks is calculated. The resulting sum is 
Wilcoxon W, which in turn is converted to Z-value and finally to the significance level 
of the abnormal return sample (Lowry 2011). These three tests are not mutually 
exclusive, so it can be useful to employ at least two of the nonparametric tests (for 
example Koh & Venkatraman 1991; Lee 2001). 
Eighth step of McWilliams and Siegel’s (1997) event study procedure is also related to 
statistical processing of results. Authors are noting that the step only concerns a sample 
of fewer than 30 companies, but justification for exactly that number are not given. The 
additional tasks for small samples include usage of bootstrapping technique and 
discussion of outliers’ impact to the results. Bootstrapping is a technique for estimating 
unknown quantities in statistical models and it is used to find standard errors for 
estimators, confidence intervals for unknown parameters or p-values for testing null 
hypothesis (Boos 2003). McWilliams and Siegel (1997) suggest using bootstrap 
technique to report probability values of test statistics that are not requiring normality 
assumptions. They criticize past event studies for not reporting any bootstrap test 
statistics, but the situation has not changed after the article and it is difficult to find even 
one event study with a mention of bootstrapping techniques. Therefore, the usefulness 
of bootstrapping remains ambiguous. 
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4. RESEARCH METHOD AND MATERIAL 
4.1. Case companies 
The sample companies were not identified as in usual event study. Instead, the two 
sample companies, Outotec Oyj and FLSmidth Co. A/S, were preselected for the 
purposes of the background project. Small amount of companies can be a minor error 
source for the parametrical statistical significance tests because the results can have 
skewness and kurtosis (Brown & Warner 1985). Controlling non-normality of the 
distribution is treated later in the methodology description along with other statistical 
significance tests. The approach in this study is very case-like which creates other 
additional requirements to the selection of companies because usually event studies are 
aimed for a wider set of companies (Brown & Warner 1985; MacKinlay 1997). For 
example the industry and the size of companies are recommended to be controlled to 
limit the sources of deviation in final results. For these reasons some relevant 
background information and financial information about the two focal companies are 
presented next to control the effect of unknown factors. 
4.1.1. Outotec 
Outotec Oyj is a global company specialized in minerals and metals processing 
technology. It is headquartered in Espoo, Finland and it has been listed in NASDAQ 
OMX Nordic Helsinki Stock Exchange (OMXH) since 10th October 2006. The stock 
symbol of Outotec is OTE1V. Earlier Outotec was the technology business unit of a 
mining and metals corporation, Outokumpu Oyj, but it spun off Outokumpu in 2006 to 
form Outokumpu Technology Oyj, which, in April 2007, changed its name to Outotec 
Oyj. (Outotec Oyj 2011c) 
The revenue of Outotec consists of technology expertise, technology transfer packages, 
licensing, plant sales and equipment sales to minerals and metals industry. Turnover 
reached 969,6 million euros in 2010 with an operating profit of 74,7 million euros. 
Outotec is divided into three business areas and the biggest business area in terms of 
sales in 2010 was Non-ferrous Solutions constituting 64% of Outotec’s total sales and 
41% of total operating profits as presented in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Outotec also lists 
services as a separate business area, but service sales are included in the sales figures of 
other business areas. (Outotec Oyj 2011b) 
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Figure 3. Sales of Outotec Oyj by business area (adapted from Outotec Oyj 2011b) 
 
Figure 4. Operating profits of Outotec Oyj by business area (adapted from Outotec Oyj  
2011b) 
Comparing the two figures we can see that Energy, Light Metals and Environmental 
solutions is the most profitable business area while Non-ferrous Solutions has the 
lowest sales margin. This observation is essential in the comparison of the economic 
impact of received orders by business area. 
The business area of Non-ferrous Solutions is composed of businesses relating to the 
processing of copper, nickel, zinc, lead, gold, silver, and platinum group metals. 
Outotec offers solutions to the entire value chain from ore to pure metal. The scope of 
projects varies from single proprietary equipment to full-scale plants with long service 
contracts. The Ferrous Solutions business area offers same kind of value chain variety 
than the Non-ferrous Solutions, but in only consists of projects related to processing of 
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iron and ferroalloys. The Energy, Light Metals and Environmental Solutions business 
area is a variety of technologies bundled under the same business area. The technologies 
in the business area include energy production methods focused on efficiency and 
cleanliness (renewable energy, oil shale, oil sand), alumina, aluminum, and other light 
metal production and environmental solutions such as sulfuric acid plants, heat recovery 
and wastewater treatment. Outotec also separates the business area of Services in its 
annual review, but the sales volume of services is included in three other business areas. 
(Outotec Oyj 2011b) 
Regarding received order contracts, Outotec has had quite solid order backlog since its 
separation from Outokumpu Oyj. Order backlog has not been on constant increase, 
instead it has fluctuated yearly between 866,4 million euros and 1393,1 million euros. 
(Outotec Oyj 2011b) Outotec’s biggest single contract before 2011 was a sulphuric acid 
plant in 2007 which had a contract value of 270 million euros (Outotec Oyj 2007). The 
five smallest contract values that Outotec has published in its press releases have been 
from 6 to 10 million euros (Outotec Oyj 2010). Outotec (2011a) states it discloses “such 
orders received, which significantly deviate from Outotec’s daily normal business 
operations either by exceptional value or magnitude”. In this case it presumably means 
non-disclosure of contracts with a value from 0 to 5 million euros. 
4.1.2. FLSmidth 
FLSmidth Co. A/S defines itself as “a leading supplier of equipment and services to the 
global cement and minerals industries” (FLSmidth 2011b). FLSmidth has its 
headquarters in Copenhagen, Denmark and it is listed in NASDAQ OMX Nordic 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange (OMXC) with the stock symbol FLS. FLSmidth was 
founded in 1882 as an engineering consulting company and since the beginning its core 
activity was selling cement manufacturing technology. In late 1980s FLSmidth started 
to diversify into other business areas and when the millennium changed, it already had a 
strong foothold in minerals industry, competing in the same area with Outokumpu 
Technology, later Outotec Oyj. (FLSmidth 2011c) 
The turnover of FLSmidth in 2010 was 2700 million euros and the year ended with an 
operating profit of 171 million euros. FLSmidth divides its business into three business 
areas: cement, minerals and Cembrit. In terms of sales, the business areas of cement and 
minerals are almost equally sized representing 93 percent of total sales (Figure 5). 
Profits are divided in a similar fashion, with an exception of lower profitability in 
Cembrit business, contributing only 1 percent of total EBIT (Figure 6). (FLSmidth 
2011a) The figures show that profitability of Cement and Minerals business areas are in 
effect identical. Thus, profit-wise the impact of orders received from these business 
areas should be the same. 
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Figure 5. Sales of FLSmidth & Co. A/S by business area (adapted from FLSmidth 
2011a) 
 
Figure 6. Operating profit of FLSmidth & Co. A/S by business area (adapted from 
FLSmidth 2011a) 
The business area of Cement comprises of FLSmidth’s cement technology all the way 
from complete cements plants to spare parts and cement production know-how. 
FLSmidth is the market leader in contracted cement kiln capacity with its 38 percent 
market share. As Outotec doesn’t operate in cement business, the two case companies 
are not competitors in this particular business area. Instead, FLSmidth competes with 
Outotec in the Minerals business area, where FLSmidth is active in supplying customers 
with equipment for mining, processing and transportation of various different minerals. 
FLSmidth is also aiming to be a full value chain system supplier, so the competition 
with Outotec is strong in many projects. The third business area, Cembrit, concentrates 
on fiber-cement products for building materials industry. (FLSmidth 2011a) 
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Order backlog of FLSmidth has followed somewhat same pattern as Outotec’s: it has 
ranged from 2,3 billion euros to 4,2 billion euros between 2006-2010, decreasing in 
2009 (FLSmidth 2011a). The most valuable single contract before 2011 has been the 
delivery of the world’s largest cement plant in February 2006, totaling 206,7 million 
euros (FLSmidth 2006). The smallest contract value that FLSmidth has disclosed is 13,4 
million euros (FLSmidth 2009). FLSmidth doesn’t elaborate on its website about the 
disclosure policy, but the lower limit of disclosed orders appears to be around 10 
million euros. A special characteristic of FLSmidth’s press releases is the disclosure of 
contract rumors. They are press releases announcing a contract that has been signed but 
is still unbinding i.e. the customer hasn’t made prepayment. This convention is probably 
originating from a suspected violation of a principle of disclosure in 2007, where 
FLSmidth failed to disclose an unbinding contract before a journalist found out about 
the contract (FLSmidth 2010). 
4.1.3. Comparison of case companies 
Some of the key figures of the two case companies are compared in Table 2 to give a 
general idea of the similarities and differences between the companies. Presented 
figures are yearend average values between 2006 and 2010, unless stated otherwise. 
Table 2. Outotec Oyj and FLSmidth Co. A/S comparison of key figures (yearend 
average values between 2006 and 2010) 
 Outotec Oyj FLSmidth Co. A/S 
Revenue (millions of euros) 961,2 2711,4 
EBIT (percentage of revenue) 7,50 8,92 
Net income (percentage of revenue) 5,62 7,02 
Order backlog (millions of euros) 1124,2 3196,6 
Book-to-bill ratio2 1,17 1,21 
Market capitalization (millions of euros) 1242,1 2796,6 
Book-to-market ratio 0,91 1,08 
Earnings per share (euros) 1,32 3,53 
P/E-ratio 30,8 15,7 
Dividend payout ratio 68,1% 24% 
 
                                                
2 Book-to-bill ratio is the size of order backlog divided by revenue of the same period 
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The figures show that the scale of activities in FLSmidth is three times larger than in 
Outotec, but operationally the companies are in a same kind of situation with their 
similar levels of EBIT and their 5-year average book-to-bill ratio slightly over 1. Stock 
ratios show some differences in the profile of stocks: Outotec is a high dividend payer 
but at the same time more expensive based on higher P/E-ratio. In chapter 2.3 it was 
described how company’s book-to-market ratio and market capitalization systematically 
affect stock returns. The comparison shows that the case companies book-to-market 
ratios are very close to each other and despite FLSmidth’s almost double-sized market 
capitalization compared to Outotec, the companies are of the same order if examined in 
Nordic-wide context. Among the 564 companies listed in stock exchanges of Helsinki, 
Stockholm and Copenhagen, FLSmidth has the 63rd largest and Outotec the 90th largest 
market capitalization (based on values on 30th September 2011). This comparison gives 
support to the argument that the stock price reaction is comparable between the two 
companies, as companies are competitors in the same industry and do not show 
fundamental differences. 
4.2. Data and event window selection 
The event date data is gathered from internet-based sources. For Outotec Oyj the press 
release archive maintained on the company website was manually examined and 
announcements regarding order contracts were saved for further usage. The preliminary 
classification yielded 74 press releases with dates ranging from 11th October 2006 to 
21st December 2010. Older press releases are found from the archive, but because 
Outotec separated from Outokumpu and listed to stock exchange as its own entity on 1st 
of October 2006, press releases before that date are omitted. The time stamps of 
announcements were cross-checked with the stock announcement archive of Nasdaq 
OMX Nordic to be sure there is no lag between Outotec website time stamps and stock 
exchange time stamps. Several time stamp inconsistencies were found because some 
announcements have been released in a different time zone, but the inconsistencies were 
corrected to match the CET+2 time stamp of Nasdaq OMX Helsinki announcement 
archive. For FLSmidth, the gathering of press releases was more automated. A search 
was made in LexisNexis news aggregation service with search terms that included 
FLSmidth as a company and newswires as a source. One particular newswire service 
was identified as the primary newswire for FLSmidth and the time stamps of the 
newswire announcements were cross-checked with the stock announcement archive of 
Nasdaq OMX Nordic to be sure there is no lag between newswire time stamp and stock 
exchange time stamp. Then the search results from LexisNexis were input into a 
semantic headline classifier, which automatically classifies news into different event 
categories. Finally, the results of automated classification were complemented, checked 
and corrected manually. This preliminary search yielded 94 press releases between 20th 
February 2006 and 10th December 2010. 
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The next step was to choose the length of the estimation window and the event window. 
Estimation window was chosen to be six calendar months with the assumption of 21 
trading days per month. To avoid the contaminating effect of pre-announcement 
information leakage, estimation window ends 10 trading days before the event date. 
Therefore, the general estimation window, in trading days, is -126 to -10 days. The 
chosen estimation window is in line with the usual length and positioning of estimation 
window in event studies. For special cases in this study, such as longer than 20-day 
event windows, the adjustments to estimation windows are noted along with the results.  
For the actual event windows, multiple different time frames are used to capture various 
aspects of the study. The longest event window is -20 to +20, and the purpose of this 
window is to show the general movement of stock price around the event and the 
significance of the shorter event windows in wider context. Other event windows range 
from -3 to +3 days. Event windows -1 to 0 and -1 to +1 are especially important, 
because they are expected to capture the largest part of stock reaction, if hypothesis of 
stock market efficiency holds. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) seek for justification for 
the usage of event windows longer than two days. In this study the mainly used event 
windows are the 1-day and 2-day windows, but the 6-day event window is to control 
short-range information leakage and to observe possible lag in investor reaction. 
Problems related to longer event windows such as controlling confounding events and 
lower statistical significance are noted (McWilliams & Siegel 1997). The 6-day event 
window is treated appropriately by searching confounding events of the whole 6-day 
event window and additional tests for significance are included. 
After choosing the relevant time periods, the initial sample of events was checked to 
eliminate events that have missing data or confounding events in their event windows. 
Firstly, the events of Outotec between October 2006 and March 2007 were eliminated 
because of missing stock data needed for 6-month estimation window. Then, 
confounding events for Outotec and FLSmidth were checked by manually scanning 
through all press releases to find significant events around order contracts. The 
classification for confounding and non-confounding events was strict, regarding only 
very minor announcements to be non-confounding. These minor announcements 
included for example invitations to quarterly Q&A session, minor changes in 
shareholding or recognition of small-scale CSR issues in trade fairs. The events that are 
undoubtedly confounding include the event types listed in chapter 3.3. The full list of 
events and filtered list after controlling missing data and confounding events are 
supplied in Appendices 1 and 2 The initial sample of 173 events narrowed down to 111 
clean events for event window -1 to +1 and 55 clean events for event window -3 to +3. 
The details of the events in clean event sample were examined further to facilitate the 
building of regression models. For each event the size and contents of order contract 
was searched from the press release and listed if found. Based on the technological 
content, orders were classified into subcategories of different business areas. The size of 
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the order contract or the technology was not always mentioned in the press release, 
resulting in slightly smaller samples for regression analysis. An important detail of the 
announcement policy of FLSmidth is announcing the order contract rumors. The outline 
of these rumor announcements and possible reason for the practice is elaborated in 
chapter 4.1.2. Because contract rumors appear to materialize in every case in the 
sample, they are considered to be significant contract announcements. The official 
announcement which the rumor concerns is also taken to the sample, so in other words 
the total effect of these pre-rumored contracts is diluted between the rumor 
announcement and the actual order announcement. In addition, there are two cases, one 
for each company, where two order contracts are announced during the same trading 
day. In both cases the business area of the two contracts is the same, so the order sizes 
are summed and they are treated as one contract. Table 3 summarizes the elimination 
criteria and sample sizes for each category. 
Table 3. Event study sample sizes 
 
In addition to the amount of events, the characteristics of event sample are described in 
a few figures to get a better idea of the composition of the event sample. One very 
important figure is the ratio between the value of announced order contracts and the 
total sales of the company from 2006 to 2010. The larger the ratio, the more 
                                                
3 Energy, Light Metals and Environmental solutions 
Elimination / 
Classification criterion 
Outotec FLSmidth Total 
Full sample 74 99 173 
 -1 to +1 -3 to +3 -1 to +1 -3 to +3 -1 to +1 -3 to +3 
Clean of confounding 
events 
44 19 67 36 111 55 
Order size announced 38 15 57 30 95 45 
Outotec business area: 
-Ferrous Solutions 
-Non-ferrous Solutions 
-ELE3 
 
9 
25 
9 
 
9 
6 
3 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
9 
25 
9 
 
9 
6 
3 
FLSmidth business area: 
-Cement 
-Minerals 
-Cembrit 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
41 
26 
0 
 
26 
10 
0 
 
41 
26 
0 
 
26 
10 
0 
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representative is the event study sample of companies’ business in general. For Outotec 
the representativeness is on a quite good level, as the announced order contracts 
contribute over 50% of total sales. The same ratio for FLSmidth is somewhat lower, so 
that the publicly announced order contracts comprise only about one third of total sales 
(Table 4). Because the policy of the minimum size of order contract to be announced 
publicly is basically same in both companies (10 million euros), the lower ratio in 
FLSmidth can be interpreted as a larger proportion of small inward cash flows such as 
service contracts. Another major characteristic is the size scale of announced contracts. 
Average value of order contracts in full sample for Outotec is 43,1 million euros and for 
FLSmidth 54,8 million euros. This difference is also visible in order quartile values, 
where Outotec’s order values are constantly on a lower level, especially in small-sized 
orders. 
Table 4. Event study sample characteristics 
 Outotec Oyj FLSmidth Co. A/S 
Total value of order announcements 
Total sales
 0,54 0,35 
Average order contract value (MEUR) 
-  Confounding events cleaned +- 1 day 
-  Confounding events cleaned +- 3 days 
43,1 
44,2 
57,0 
54,8 
55,9 
57,5 
Order contract values 
-Minimum value 
-1st quartile 
-2nd quartile (median) 
-3rd quartile 
-Maximum value 
 
6,0 
17,0 
25,0 
46,5 
270,0 
 
13,4 
31,2 
43,0 
63,5 
206,7 
 
Besides event data, the gathering of stock and market data is an important step of event 
study. Analyzed stock data is daily adjusted closing price data. Stock data source is 
Nasdaq OMX database, where adjusted daily closing data is freely available. The 
representative market data for Outotec and FLSmidth are market performance indices of 
Nasdaq OMX Helsinki (OMXHPI) and Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen (OMXCPI) 
respectively. Because the literature strongly supports the use of value-weighted market 
index instead of equal-weighted market index, the former is used. Index data was also 
gathered from freely available Nasdaq OMX database. If either stock data or market 
data was missing from a particular day the reason for the missing data was attempted to 
be pinned down. For almost all of these cases the reason was incorrectly logged non-
trading day market data. In couple of instances stock data was missing, but the missing 
days didn’t overlap with any event windows. For the regression analysis examining fifth 
hypothesis, the monthly inflation levels converted to yearly inflation percentage were 
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collected from Eurostat for Finland, Denmark and European Union (Figure 7). For each 
event the inflation level of the event month is searched and added to the data. 
Eventually, the resulting table of events includes five columns for each event: event 
timestamp, company (Outotec or FLSmidth), order contract value in euros, business 
area of the order contract and inflation level of the event month. 
 
Figure 7. Monthly inflation data (as yearly values) for European Union, Denmark and 
Finland (Eurostat) 
The used stock returns are converted from the adjusted daily closing prices to daily 
return percentages using continuously compounded (or logarithmic) return calculation. 
The return levels are input to the estimation and abnormal return calculation model as 
unitless quantities, for example 4 percent as 0,04. Thus, the abnormal return results are 
output in the same way.  
4.3. Abnormal return calculation method 
A wide range of abnormal return calculation methods is presented in chapter 3.4. From 
the presented methods the prevailing method in event study literature, single-index 
market model or SIMM, is selected for this event study for various reasons. Because of 
the limited sample size the detection of abnormal returns could pose a problem in this 
research, so the methods with fundamentally lower abnormal detection rate such as 
mean-adjusted return model and market-adjusted return model are rejected. Although 
the market adjusted return model would have enabled longer sample period because the 
initial stock listing of Outotec would not cause a 6-month gap, the abnormal return 
detection is still a priority. Regarding multiple index models, there is some literature 
supporting the usage of industry indexes in industry-limited studies (MacKinlay 1997), 
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and the company sample of this thesis can be seen very concentrated industry-wise. 
Still, an industry index for the case companies is hard to define. At first glance a mining 
industry index (for example FTSE 350 Mining) might seem representative, but it covers 
only about a half of FLSmidth’s customers: the business area of minerals. An index for 
technology solution companies such as FLSmidth and Outotec was not found. The 
notion of world market model introduced by Park (2004) is acknowledged but not 
applied because this study is not a full scale multi-country event study as Park describes 
it, but a two-country event study setting where results of the different countries are 
treated separately. The problem for applying three-factor CAPM is that the additional 
factors are only calculated for US markets, rendering the model inaccurate for Nordic 
markets. Generalizing for this study, all the multiple index models have too much 
uncertainty compared to the additional explaining power of the models, so the usage is 
not justified. 
More precisely, the usage of SIMM model in this study follows the formulas presented 
by Campbell et al. (1997, pp.158-163). Following the timeline in Figure 2, event day is 
defined to be τ = 0, estimation window length L1 =  T1 - T0 and event window length L2 
= T3 - T2. A special remark of the notation of time windows in this event study is that 
closing prices of each day are used to represent the daily stock returns. This means that 
the event day return is captured between closing prices of day -1 and day 0, thus the 
notation -1 to 0 days means the event day, 0 to +1 days means one day after the event 
day etc. The market model return parameters are estimated as a regression system is 
 !! = !!!! + !! (16)  
where Ri = [ RiT0 + 1 … RiT1 ]´ is an ( L1 x 1 ) vector of stock’s estimation windows 
returns, Xi = [ ι Rm ] is an ( L2 x 2 ) matrix with a vector of ones in the first column and 
the market return observation vector Rm = [ RmT0+1 … RmT1 ] in the second column. The 
vector θi = [ αi βi ]´ includes the estimation parameters of SIMM. The OLS estimation is 
performed following the method of Campbell et al. (1997) and the OLS parameters are 
used to achieve abnormal return vector for each event. Abnormal returns vectors are 
aggregated and cumulated over time as in chapter 4.4.3 of Campbell et al. (1997).  
4.4. Analysis of statistical significance and sensitivity 
The analysis of statistical significance must be especially careful in this study because 
the sample size is smaller than generally in event studies. Besides calculating the actual 
cumulative abnormal return, the results are also parameterized by standard deviation for 
parametrical test statistics purposes. Campbell et al. (1997, pp.161-162) give two 
different ways of testing the abnormal returns against null hypothesis, although the 
results are not expected to be sensitive to the choice. In this study the one with equal 
weighting of the individual standardized cumulative abnormal return observations is 
used (1997, p.162). The parametric p-values are calculated with the formula 
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 !! = ! !! − 4!! − 2 ½ !"#$(!!, !!)   !~! (0,1) (17)  
where J2 equals the p-value of standardized cumulative abnormal return from τ1 to τ2. 
This formula can also be used for results that are aggregated over securities. 
In addition to parametric tests, a well-executed event study needs to have non-
parametric tests. In this study, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used because it 
considers also the size of abnormal return observations thus giving an in-depth view of 
the distribution of abnormal return observations around the value of zero. The procedure 
of calculating Wilcoxon p-value in this study is the following (Lowry 2011): 
1) The absolute value of each abnormal return observation of the sample is taken 
2) The absolute values are ranked from lowest to highest, giving rank 1 to smallest 
value, rank 2 to second smallest etc. If two or more values are tied, the average 
of tied ranks is given to each tied value (for example if rank 7 and 8 are tied, 
both are given rank 7,5). 
3) The original sign of the abnormal return observation is re-attached to the rank, 
resulting in an array of signed-ranks. 
4) Signed ranks are summed. The sum is Wilcoxon W, symbolized as W. 
5) Standard deviation of the sampling distribution W, σW, is calculated from 
 !! = !(! + 1)(2! + 1)6  (18)  
and the z-value of Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 
 ! =! − 0,5!!  (19)  
6) The z-value is converted to Wilcoxon p-value assuming standard normal 
distribution. 
The Wilcoxon p-values are treated two-tailed in the same fashion as parametric p-values 
with significance levels 15%, 10% and 5%. When examining the significance of results 
the parametric p-value and the Wilcoxon p-value are compared and the less significant 
value is regarded to be the overall significance of a specific result. 
The results can be sensitive to the selected estimation window. The sensitivity is tested 
by calculating some of the main results with three different estimation windows. The 
main window, -126 to -10 is compared to two other estimation windows: -42 to -10 
days and -84 to -10 days. This is an important step to test the robustness of results in 
relation to estimation window length. 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1. Results of hypotheses 
5.1.1. Hypothesis 1: General reaction 
The following results present the average abnormal stock return effect of order contract 
announcements in the two case companies during 2006 and 2010. The five hypotheses 
built on basis of theoretical background are examined one by one moving from more 
general hypotheses to the detailed analysis of abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis 1: Investors positively react to the announcements of order 
contracts. 
First hypothesis is the most general one, examining only the existence and directionality 
of stock price reaction. The results for first hypothesis are divided into three: the general 
stock reaction (Table 5) and company-specific reactions (Table 6 and Table 7). For each 
category different lengths of event windows are tested to analyze the timing of the 
investor reaction. Investigating the full sample of events of both companies reveals that 
the stock reaction is positive as expected. The significant reaction (0,57% abnormal 
return) is perceived in event window -1 to 0, which means the reaction happens during 
the day of the stock market announcement. It is notable that if event window is 
lengthened even one day to cover the day after the announcement, the significance of 
stock reaction is heavily reduced because day +1 has a negative (but statistically 
insignificant) abnormal return. Besides the direction and intensity of the abnormal stock 
return reaction, the result suggests that no information leakage occurs at least three days 
before the event. Instantaneousness and brevity of the abnormal return effect 
demonstrates the economic approach through which the stock reaction is filtered 
through. The rational expectations approach does not seem prevailing because a 
significant reaction is found. Additionally, the myopic approach is not supported 
because reaction is quick; thus investors generally react according to neoclassical 
approach. Again, this interpretation does not imply that two other approaches are 
definitely wrong. For example, investor myopia can still occur in some strategic order 
contracts, but it is just not visible in the larger sample. Similarly, investors could have 
rational expectations of certain projects, but the majority of contracts are still new 
information to investors. 
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Table 5. Outotec and FLSmidth abnormal returns, full sample 
Event 
window 
n Abnormal return p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-3 to +3 55 0,0011 0,93 0,87 
-1 to +1 111 0,0025 0,41 0,47 
-4 to -3 55 -0,0053 0,24 0,01*** 
-3 to -2 55 -0,0044 0,32 0,06** 
-2 to -1 111 0,0003 0,98 0,76 
-1 to 0 111 0,0057 0,05** <0,01*** 
0 to +1 111 -0,0032 0,43 0,12* 
+1 to +2 55 0,0012 0,94 0,92 
+2 to +3 55 -0,0019 0,72 0,53 
-P-values are two-tailed 
* Significant at 15% level 
** Significant at 10% level 
*** Significant at 5% level 
 
5.1.2. Hypothesis 2: Net income percentage 
Second hypothesis examines the differences in abnormal returns between the two case 
companies. Compared to first hypothesis, which was concentrating on general market 
efficiency surrounding order contracts, the second hypothesis seeks to find out if the 
profitability of a company is a significant factor in average abnormal reaction. 
Hypothesis 2: Stock price reaction to announced order contract is stronger 
(weaker) in a company with a higher (lower) net income percentage. 
The net income levels of Outotec and FLSmidth are, respectively, 5,62 percent and 7,02 
percent (Table 2). The difference is not large and during some time periods the net 
income of Outotec has been slightly greater than FLSmidth’s, but overall the stock price 
reaction of FLSmidth should be about 25 percent higher if the correlation is as 
straightforward as the hypothesis suggests. Factors that could skew the company-
specific results are different inflation level, the significance of unannounced cash flows 
to company and the size difference of announced orders between companies. The effect 
of varying inflation level is assumed to be the same in both companies, because their 
inflation follows the same pattern (Figure 7) and they both have contracts evenly 
throughout the five-year period. The order size difference depicted in Table 4 shows 
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that the predicted higher abnormal return reaction of FLSmidth should be further 
boosted by size effect because the average order size is larger in FLSmidth. 
The event study results give the similar direction of abnormal return effect that is 
hypothesized, but the magnitude of the effect does not fully support the second 
hypothesis. Table 6 and Table 7 exhibit the company-specific abnormal returns in 
various event windows. Outotec and FLSmidth have statistically significant abnormal 
returns on the event day, and the degree of abnormal return is practically the same in 
both companies: 0,57 percent for Outotec and 0,56 percent for FLSmidth. If the 
abnormal return percentage is converted to euro denominated growth in market 
capitalization (using year-end 5-year average in Table 2), the result can be interpreted 
more accurately. Average market capitalization increase caused by abnormal returns on 
event day for Outotec is 7,1 million euros and for FLSmidth 15,6 million euros, as the 
market capitalization of FLSmidth is more than two times larger than Outotec’s. The 
theoretical average market capitalization increase per contract, calculated by 
multiplying the average order contract size by company’s average net income 
percentage, is 2,48 million euros for Outotec and 3,92 million euros for FLSmidth. 
Thus, the actual stock price reaction is almost three times larger for Outotec and four 
times larger for FLSmidth compared to what the theoretical calculation suggests. This 
could be a sign for at least two things: investors generally regard contracts more 
valuable than what the price tag shows, for example seeing the contracts generating 
continuity to business and new opportunities in the future, or that the company-wide net 
income percentage is not a matching indicator with the profit margin of announced 
order contracts. For example, if the unannounced portion of company sales has a low 
profit margin, it has to be compensated in a greater margin of announced contracts. In 
this case the investors are presumed to be well aware of company profit and cost 
structure to incorporate the different profit margins to their reaction. 
The company-specific results also show significant negative abnormal returns a few 
days before the event. For Outotec the 1,32 percent drop happens two days before the 
event and it is significant at 2% level. For FLSmidth the price drop happens three days 
before the event, it is 0,69 percent and significant at 5% level. The reason for these 
stock price slumps is unclear and without further evidence very hard to explain. 
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Table 6. Outotec abnormal returns, full sample 
Event 
window 
n Abnormal return p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-3 to +3 19 -0,007 0,76 0,55 
-1 to +1 44 0,0005 0,72 0,50 
-4 to -3 19 -0,0022 0,47 0,45 
-3 to -2 19 -0,0132 0,02*** <0,01*** 
-2 to -1 44 -0,0011 0,76 0,77 
-1 to 0 44 0,0057 0,06** 0,06** 
0 to +1 44 -0,0053 0,16 0,09* 
+1 to +2 19 0,0056 0,43 0,34 
+2 to +3 19 -0,0054 0,46 0,32 
-P-values are two-tailed 
* Significant at 15% level 
** Significant at 10% level 
*** Significant at 5% level 
 
Table 7. FLSmidth abnormal return, full sample 
Event 
window 
n Abnormal return p-value  Wilcoxon p-value 
-3 to +3 36 0,0053 0,69 0,80 
-1 to +1 67 0,0038 0,17 0,23 
-4 to -3 36 -0,0069 0,05** 0,01*** 
-3 to -2 36 0,0003 0,75 0,91 
-2 to -1 67 0,0003 0,75 0,83 
-1 to 0 67 0,0056 0,02*** 0,05** 
0 to +1 67 -0,0018 0,63 0,54 
+1 to +2 36 -0,0012 0,47 0,32 
+2 to +3 36 -0,0001 0,82 1,00 
-P-values are two-tailed 
* Significant at 15% level 
** Significant at 10% level 
*** Significant at 5% level 
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5.1.3. Hypothesis 3: Size of order contract 
Third hypothesis requires approaching the raw results of the event study with other 
methods than previous hypotheses. Single events and their abnormal returns are treated 
as separate observations to build a model that links the size of the order contract and the 
abnormal return level to examine the third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The positive abnormal return reaction is linearly correlated with 
the value of the order contract. 
To find the possible linear correlation the order contract size is regressed with abnormal 
return. Both companies are treated separately to filter out the company specific variance 
sources. The abnormal return of the order is defined to be the abnormal return between 
day -1 and day 0 because it was earlier noticed to be the only significant event window 
for both companies. 
The regression graphs for Outotec and FLSmidth are exhibited in Figure 8 and Figure 9, 
and the regression statistics with ANOVA in Table 8. The regression result for Outotec 
is a rising line with slope of 0,00016. In the actual context it means 0,016 percent of 
abnormal returns per one million euro in order contract value. For example a contract 
with a value of 100 million euros should yield 1,6 percent abnormal return. This is a 
very rough result though, as the extremely low R2-value reveals that much of the 
variance is not explained by this simple regression. Nevertheless, the significance of F 
shows that null hypothesis against the linear effect of order contract size to abnormal 
returns can be rejected on a 10 percent significance level. From Figure 8 it is perceived 
that the low-value order contracts have the highest variance in abnormal return level. 
Outotec states that it discloses “such orders received, which significantly deviate from 
Outotec’s daily normal business operations either by exceptional value or magnitude” 
(Outotec Oyj 2011a), so the contracts with lowest price tags may include some intrinsic 
value such as breakthrough of new technology or entering new markets. This claim of 
implicit value of small-value contracts is supported by the results of running the 
regression again excluding order contracts below 10 million euros: R2 is increased from 
0,075 to 0,125. The negative outliers in low-value contracts still remain as question 
marks. One interesting result is the negative value of Y-axis intercept term. Of course it 
can merely be an estimation error, but if the result is interpreted straightforwardly, it 
means that announcing orders with value of less than 15 million euros is not 
advantageous for Outotec. Anyhow, this subject would definitely need more research to 
draw solid conclusions that could have managerial implications. 
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Figure 8. Outotec order contract sizes regressed with abnormal returns 
  
 
Figure 9. FLSmidth order contract sizes regressed with abnormal returns 
Similar regression graph (Figure 9) for FLSmidth does not produce significant results. 
The slope of the linear regression line is minimal, R2 is barely over 0,01 and 
significance of F is over 40 percent. Graph shows that especially in the order size region 
from 20 million to 50 million euros the variance of abnormal returns is huge. Using 
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only the size of order contract to build an explaining model of abnormal returns is a 
definite model misspecification in the case of FLSmidth. Therefore additional 
explaining factors must be sought. 
Table 8. Order size regression statistics and ANOVA 
 Outotec FLSmidth 
n 38 57 
Multiple R 0,27 0,11 
R2 0,08 0,01 
Adjusted R2 0,05 -0,01 
Standard Error 0,02 0,02 
F 2,92 0,70 
F significance 0,10 0,40 
Y intercept -0,0024 0,003 
X variable (Order size) 0,00016 (p=0,10) 0,00004 (p=0,40) 
 
5.1.4. Hypothesis 4: Business area 
The fourth hypothesis is an additional explanatory variable for the abnormal returns. 
With the same theoretical logic that differentiated euro denominated company-specific 
abnormal returns, business areas with varying profit margins should also be valued 
differently by investors. The difference of stock reaction between business areas is 
analyzed with two separate methods: business area specific averages and multiple 
regression. Business area averages and their significances are exhibited in Table 9. 
Multiple regression with size and business area dummy variables is performed to both 
companies separately to test the fit of the regression model (Table 10). For a visual 
presentation the scatter plots with regression lines are presented in Figure 10 and Figure 
11. 
Hypothesis 4: The stock price reaction is affected by the operating margin of 
the business area to which the received contract belongs. 
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Table 9. Business area specific abnormal returns 
 Abnormal return 
 -1 to 0 p-value -1 to +1 p-value -3 to +3 p-value 
Outotec: Non-Ferrous 0,0022 0,45 0,0004 0,81 -0,0028 0,92 
Outotec: Ferrous 0,0066 0,32 -0,0148 0,28 -0,0191 0,46 
Outotec: ELE 0,0101 0,21 0,0112 0,28 0,0175 0,62 
FLSmidth: Minerals 0,0075 0,04*** 0,0033 0,30 0,0255 0,17 
FLSmidth: Cement 0,0044 0,15* 0,0042 0,30 -0,0024 0,70 
-P-values are two-tailed 
* Significant at 15% level 
** Significant at 10% level 
*** Significant at 5% level 
 
Business area specific abnormal return results yield two results significant at 15 percent 
level. The two significant positive returns occur during the event day in both business 
areas of FLSmidth. The company sales and profit figures of FLSmidth (Figure 5 and 
Figure 6) show that the actual operating profit of Cement business area and Minerals 
business area are roughly the same. This is not consistent with event study results, 
where the abnormal returns of Minerals business is 0,75 percent but the corresponding 
figure for Cement business is 0,44 percent. The general stock price reaction between the 
business areas is much larger that the operating profit suggests. 
None of the abnormal return results of Outotec are significant in parametric tests, but if 
the abnormal return values are nevertheless interpreted, the values of different areas 
correspond with actual business area profits. Comparing Outotec’s sales and profit 
figures (Figure 3 and Figure 4) it is seen that Energy, Light Metals and Environmental 
Solutions is the most profitable business area, while Non-Ferrous Solutions is the least 
profitable. The same rank is visible in abnormal returns: ELE business area has an 
abnormal return level just over 1 percent and Non-Ferrous business barely over 0,2 
percent, while Ferrous business area has abnormal return level close to company 
average. However, the non-significant p-values still indicate that abnormal return 
variance inside single business areas is too high to draw solid conclusions of business 
area effect to investor reaction. The variance appears to be especially high in ELE 
business area, where even 1 percent abnormal return is not significant whereas in 
FLSmidth 0,44 percent abnormal return is significant. 
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Table 10. Order size and business area multiple regression statistics and ANOVA 
 
Outotec FLSmidth 
n 37 57 
Multiple R 0,20 0,17 
R Square 0,04 0,03 
Adjusted R Square -0,05 -0,01 
Standard Error 0,02 0,02 
F 0,46 0,78 
F significance 0,71 0,46 
Y intercept 0,007 0,0001 
X variable 1 (Order size) -0,0001 (p=0,35) 0,00005 (p=0,29) 
X variable 2 (Dummy 1) 0,003 (p=0,81) 0,004 (p=0,36) 
X variable 3 (Dummy 2) -0,004 (p=0,72) N/A 
 
Regression statistics and ANOVA indicate that business area dummy variables do not 
appear to be explaining factors of abnormal return variance. Compared to simple 
regression with only order size as a variable, the multiple regression with business area 
variables is not improving any of the goodness of fit statistics of Outotec. For FLSmidth 
the regression statistics remain in the same insignificant level as earlier. Results of 
multiple regression cannot be directly visualized, but if the different business areas are 
plotted to same graph, it gives an idea why the business area explanation is inaccurate. 
If the fourth hypothesis was true, the resulting graph would be parallel linear regression 
lines with their y-intercept value growing along with business area EBIT. The figures 
for both companies show that this not the case. For Outotec, the slope of order contracts 
in ferrous segment is ten times larger than the slope of non-ferrous segment. The slope 
of energy, light metals and environmental solutions segment is in between, but the 
observations for that segment are scattered all around (R2=0,14). For non-ferrous 
segment the coefficient of determination is even lower (R2=0,04). The ferrous segment 
has significantly lower R2 (0,44), but the low amount of observations (n=9) in the 
segment makes the result questionable. 
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Figure 10. Outotec regression with separate business areas 
 
Figure 11. FLSmidth regression with separate business areas 
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The graph of FLSmidth reveals similar inconsistencies as the graph of Outotec. 
Conversely to the theoretical background the slope of minerals segment is negative 
meaning diminishing abnormal returns as order sizes increase. The significance of this 
result is very weak though, and the one negative outlier in high-value contracts is a 
major factor in turning the slope to negative value. The high variance of abnormal 
returns in order contract sizes between 20 and 50 million euros, noticed already in 
previous regression graph of FLSmidth, is also not explained by dividing observations 
into business areas, because other business areas have major outliers in the same region. 
Again, some other factors than business area are behind the variability of FLSmidth’s 
abnormal returns. 
5.1.5. Hypothesis 5: Inflation 
The fifth hypothesis is examining the effect of macroeconomic variables to abnormal 
returns. If the hypothesis holds, it is a signal that investors can systematically valuate 
macroeconomic factors at least to some one-time events such as order contracts. The 
directionality of inflation effect is hypothesized to be negatively correlated, in other 
words when inflation is higher, the abnormal return is lower. Thus, the regression-based 
inflation variable should be negative. 
Hypothesis 5: The stock price reaction includes the effect of current inflation: 
during times of high inflation the order contracts are not valued as much as 
during low inflation. 
Business area dummy variables are omitted from this phase, because they were not 
found to be explaining factors during the analysis of fourth hypothesis. A multiple 
regression analysis is performed separately to both companies with two variables: order 
size and inflation level of the order announcement moment. Inflation level is input in 
the regression as raw number, not in percentages (for example 1% as 0,01). The 
regression statistics and ANOVA is presented in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Order size and inflation level multiple regression statistics and ANOVA 
 
Outotec FLSmidth 
n 38 57 
Multiple R 0,32 0,26 
R Square 0,10 0,07 
Adjusted R Square 0,05 0,03 
Standard Error 0,02 0,02 
F 2,04 2,00 
F significance 0,14 0,15 
Y intercept 0,004 0,010 
X variable 1 (Order size) 0,0002 (p=0,07) 0,00007 (p=0,20) 
X variable 2 (Inflation) -0,33 (p=0,29) -0,35 (p=0,08) 
 
Statistics show very similar values for the inflation variable for both companies. The 
sign of inflation variable is negative as expected. For FLSmidth adding the inflation 
variable to regression model has increased the significance of order contract size 
(p=0,20), but it still not significant at 10% level. FLSmidth’s inflation variable itself is 
significant at 10% level (p=0,08). For Outotec the inflation variable is not significant 
(p=0,29), and even though in this model the significance of order size variable is 
increased compared to earlier results (p=0,07), the overall significance is not at 10% 
level (F significance = 0,14). The result implies that the investors of these two 
companies react to inflation level differently. For FLSmidth the reaction is systematical 
and significant, but for Outotec it seems not to be such a relevant factor. 
5.2. Longer event window 
In the results of second hypothesis, where company-specific abnormal returns were 
examined, one special observation was the significant negative abnormal return two to 
three days before the event. The results of the longest event window (-20 to +20 days) 
demonstrate this pre-announcement negative drift clearly (Figure 12). The sample used 
in producing the figure is the events of both companies with confounding events cleared 
from days -1 to +1. Thus, the event window is not clear of confounding events. 
However, the larger sample size reduces the effect of confounding events. The 
estimation window is adjusted to be from -126 days to -21 to avoid the overlap with 
  66
event window. The negative drift starts 13 days before the announcement and continues 
until the strong positive reaction on the event day. After day +1 the stock starts drifting 
upwards, reaching the same level as in day -13 at day +5. The daily abnormal return 
changes of the longest event window show how the event day abnormal return is the 
largest, but another major change happens on day +15. 
 
Figure 12. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) -20 to +20 days, both companies 
(n=111) 
 
Figure 13. Daily abnormal return change -20 to +20 days, both companies (n=111) 
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The interpretation of the longest event window is not theoretically backed in this thesis 
as it is outside the built hypotheses. The graphs rather show the size of order contract 
reaction in a wider context and support the conclusion of the significant event day stock 
reaction. The negative pre-announcement drift is definitely an important phenomenon 
because it seems to “eat” the positive order announcement reaction two weeks before 
the announcement, but the explanation for the negative drift is yet to be determined. 
However, with this research setup the explanation is impossible to find out. 
5.3. Result sensitivity and error sources 
Sensitivity of the results as for the length of the estimation window is tested by running 
the abnormal return calculations with three different estimation windows. The 
significance level presented in Table 12 is based solely on parametrical p-value. 
Wilcoxon’s signed-rank tests or further steps in the research, such as regression 
analysis, are not performed with the other estimation windows. Overall, the results with 
different estimation windows are not distinctly deviating. Most importantly, the longer 
estimation window does not produce results that are more significant than the results of 
shorter event windows. Thus, the original results give a conservative view of the 
abnormal stock reaction of announced order contracts. 
Table 12. Result sensitivity to estimation window length 
 Outotec FLSmidth 
Estimation 
window length 
(days) 
116 74 32 116 74 32 
Abnormal 
return -1 to +1 
0,0005 0,0015 0,0010 0,0038 0,0043** 0,0040** 
Abnormal 
return -1 to 0 
0,0057** 0,0061*** 0,0056* 0,0056*** 0,0057*** 0,0057*** 
Abnormal 
return -3 to +3 
-0,0070 -0,0032 -0,0058 0,0053 0,0055 0,0059 
 
When possible error sources for the study are analyzed, the errors deepest in the method 
could be flaws in event study sample creation or in the abnormal return calculation 
method. The overall sample is chosen to be, rather unorthodoxly to event studies, only 
two companies. This creates methodological challenges that are partly tackled with the 
research design of the thesis, but some issues remain. Outotec and FLSmidth are 
competitors, which may imply that order contract reactions are mutually correlated. The 
similar effect that Hoffer et al. (1988) discovered to exist between automobile 
manufacturers’ product recall announcements could be a significant factor also in this 
study, meaning that confounding events should have been checked also from the other 
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company. In case of Outotec and FLSmidth it is highly possible that the companies 
compete for the same projects and the success of the first means loss for the other. 
Another uncertain supposition of independency is behind the hypothesis that is 
examining inflation: for the regression analysis the order size and the inflation level are 
assumed not to be independent. In reality, the varying inflation could be a sign of same 
macroeconomic fluctuation that influences how big contracts customers are generally 
tending to sign. Thus, the independency assumption can be disputed. 
For the event sample of FLSmidth one questionable detail is the way of handling event 
rumors. Treating the contract rumor announcement and the following official 
announcement as separate events, the effect of the event is split to two instances and the 
total effect is not accurately captured. Seven rumor-based pre-announcement cases 
occur in the largest sample of FLSmidth events so it is a slight drawback in accuracy. 
Another issue is the representativeness of the selected sample of company business as a 
whole. In FLSmidth this error is more possible, as the total value of announced order 
contracts represents only one third of total sales. For Outotec the same figure is about 
half of the sales. What the representativeness issue could cause is the misspecification 
of the profitability of announced order contracts. In the analysis of fourth hypothesis it 
is assumed that announced contracts have the same profitability than the business area 
as a whole. This assumption could be wrong, if the business logic is for example to sell 
the larger facilities with low margins and to gain profits later with signing multiple 
maintenance service contracts that are too low-value to be disclosed publicly. Different 
types of facilities could therefore have different levels of implicit profits that are 
expected to realize later in the life cycle of a product, and these are not shown in this 
thesis. 
As the literature review of event study methodology illustrates, the diversity of 
abnormal return calculation methods is vast and there is potential to refine the model to 
be very sophisticated. In this study the method was chosen to be a compromise of 
accuracy and simplicity, but it could undoubtedly be questioned is the model accurate 
enough. Possible refinements include adding the variables of world market model 
defined by Park (2004), an industry index variable and Fama-French three factor 
variables (1992). These changes might have lowered the overall variance of abnormal 
returns and the results could have given a better explanation power to the more detailed 
hypotheses, but this speculation remains unsolved. 
The hypotheses of the business area effect and inflation effect did not get much support 
from the empirical analysis. For the consideration of false negative (or type II) error 
some details of these results are useful to analyze. The role of inflation was derived 
from the findings of fundamental analysis (Lev & Thiagarajan 1993). In the original 
study the inflation changes were significantly higher than in this thesis, ranging from 
1,9 percent to 13,5 percent. Perhaps the inflation factor would have been more visible 
with higher fluctuation of the inflation level. One specific note from the business area 
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abnormal return averages is the high variance of Outotec’s ELE business area. This is 
logical, since ELE is a collection of various technologies ranging from aluminum 
refining to water treatment and thus the profitability of projects can be highly varying. 
The accuracy of results could have been improved by replacing the averages of 
companies’ key figures with event time specific figures. For example in the calculation 
of theoretical average abnormal return per order contract the five-year average value 
was used, which is not very representative of all the orders because of the fluctuation 
over time. Presumably Outotec won more orders during general economic growth, but 
in the analysis the orders are presumed to be divided evenly to the five-year 
examination period. The inaccuracy of averages also affects the calculations based on 
market capitalization which was very fluctuating during the time period. For example 
the year-end values of market capitalization of Outotec varied from 450 million euros to 
2100 million euros. 
5.4. Discussion and evaluation of the research 
The broad task behind the main research question was to find out if winning order 
contracts is regarded by investors only as “business as usual” or is every signed order 
contract a driver for stock price growth. The results successfully give answers to this 
broad question but also go deeper into the analysis of order contract reaction with 
additional hypotheses. The problem of analyzing the more specific hypotheses is that 
the effect of hypothesized variables in hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 (size, business area and 
inflation) is relatively low compared to other factors that are creating variance to the 
results. When there is only a minor abnormal return effect, a large sample would be 
needed to detect the effect, but in this study the sample size was relatively small, 
causing the possible effect of selected variables to vanish into the noise created by other 
variables or random movement of stock prices. This is perhaps the main reason why 
additional hypotheses could not bring results that would be somehow statistically 
significant. 
The first research objective was to identify the key elements and issues of event study 
methodology. The aim of this objective was not to produce results that are demonstrated 
in results section, but to collect a compilation of methodological choices and possible 
pitfalls of performing event studies. From the presented research detail options the 
methodology of this particular study was selected only after the theory part. The second 
research objective was to define the general stock market reaction to order contract 
announcements. The general reaction is formulated into hypothesis 1. A significant 
stock price reaction is found and the null hypothesis is rejected. The directionality of the 
effect is positive as predicted, showing that investors generally value the 
announcements of order contracts. From the perspective of economic theories the result 
shows that investors do not possess all the relevant information of the order contract 
before the announcement, or, in other words, market efficiency in this case has the 
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semi-strong form. This is in line with numerous previous researches of market 
efficiency. 
Validating the first hypothesis builds the basis for later hypotheses, which seek to 
achieve research objectives 2a and 2b. These research objectives aimed to detect the 
difference of stock reaction between the companies and the role of smaller details of 
order contract announcements. The second hypothesis states a difference between the 
stock price reaction of case companies and the null hypothesis is rejected again. This 
means that on company level investors can be perceived as somewhat systematical 
group in its reaction. That said, the sample of only two companies does not give a fully 
reliable picture of the situation. The higher net income percentage seems to boost the 
stock price reaction of order contract announcement of FLSmidth, but this can also be a 
mere coincidence and the result should be validated with additional companies with 
differing net income percentage levels. 
The problems of the methodology start to arise already in the third hypothesis, where 
the size of order contract is hypothesized to be correlated with stock price reaction. Size 
is perceived to be an explanatory variable of Outotec’s abnormal return variation, but 
most of the variance is still to be explained. For FLSmidth no correlation is found, 
leaving some doubt also to the results of Outotec. Plotting single observations as a 
scatter plot of size and abnormal return level reveals that abnormal returns are not 
cleanly centered on the positive side of axis, but surprisingly many observations are on 
the negative side. The role of outliers is also noticed to be strong. The same size of 
order contract could result in positive abnormal return of 4 percent or just as well, 
without rational explanation, negative abnormal return of 4 percent. 
The fourth hypothesis expects that the stock price reaction would be affected by the 
operating margin of a business area where the order contract belongs to. Ideally, this 
hypothesis would have cleared the inconsistencies of third hypothesis, separating the 
outliers to different business areas and reduced coefficient of determination. However, 
the hypothesis fails to raise the prediction power of the model. Only statistically highly 
significant positive abnormal return was in the business area of minerals in FLSmidth. 
No correlation of business area and abnormal return level is found and null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. In this point the size of subsamples are also starting to be too small 
for achieving generalizable results. 
For the fifth hypothesis the task was to detect the minor impact to stock price reaction 
caused by changing inflation level. Order size was left as another explaining variable in 
the multiple regression analysis, because it produced significant result at least for the 
other company. The results of fifth hypothesis were not conclusive, but still showed 
quite noticeable correlation of stock price reaction and inflation. Directionality of the 
effect was as predicted and the value of inflation variable was approximately same in 
both companies. For FLSmidth the statistical test showed inflation being a significant 
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explaining factor of abnormal return variance, but for Outotec the result was not so 
clear. The promising result of fifth hypothesis still showed that even with sample size of 
around 100 events it is possible to detect minor explanatory variables, if they are 
systematical enough. 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) note how many event studies lack the details which 
would make the study possible to replicate. They emphasize the role of detailed and 
justified research methodology to create a possibility of replication. Furthermore, these 
characteristics are also important for the reliability and validity of a research. Saunders 
et al. (2009, p.156) describe those two things as the cornerstones of creating credible 
research findings. Reliability refers to the consistency of the research design. A reliable 
study would yield the same results if done on other occasion, by other researcher or 
observer. Transparency of the process of converting data into results is also a key factor 
of reliability. Validity is assessing if the result really answers the research questions and 
if the method is well-founded to an extent that it really measures what it is supposed to 
measure. From the definition we can see that reliability is a necessary condition for 
validity but not sufficient. An instrument can reliably produce similar results from test 
to test, but it does not imply that the result is necessarily right. 
Concerning reliability there are various aspects in the research design aiming to improve 
the reliability of this research. The transparency of the data analysis process is on a high 
level, and the factors contributing to transparency include reporting company names and 
full list of event dates, describing clearly what types of events are treated as 
confounding events and listing the cleaned list of events, informing the source of stock 
data, event data, event details and inflation data, and presenting the exact form of 
employed abnormal return calculation formulas, including the tests of statistical 
significance. Following the described steps in this thesis and using the same raw data, a 
replication of this study would most probably yield similar results. In a quantitative 
research such as this, the subject or participant error and bias are minimal. 
The validity of this thesis is a trickier question. Validity can be divided into internal 
validity, meaning the degree of well-founded causality inside the research setting, and 
external validity, meaning the extent to which the research can be generalized outside 
this particular research setting into other situations. (Saunders et al. 2009, pp.157-159) 
A validity problem can arise for example if the test situation changes the normal 
behavior of test subjects or if in the selection of test subjects the process is biased. For 
this particular research an important factor for validity is the theoretic foundation on 
which the hypotheses are built, or the construct validity. The most general hypotheses 
are based on rather common and shared assumptions of business theories, but when the 
tested variables move into smaller details such as business area and inflation one could 
ask if these variables are fairly chosen. For example inflation level can merely be an 
observable variable of various latent variables regarding macroeconomic situation, and 
therefore it is not indicating the phenomenon correctly. Another issue of internal 
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validity is the treatment of confounding events. The classification of events to 
confounding events is very broad when the events happen in the same company, but on 
the other hand confounding events from the minerals and metals processing technology 
industry are not checked. Outotec and FLSmidth are competitors in some business 
areas, so the order contract won by Outotec could possibly result in a negative reaction 
in the stock price of FLSmidth. This reciprocal influence to share prices might have 
explained some of the numerous negative abnormal returns on event day observed in 
both companies. 
Besides internal validity, the external validity has many question marks in this thesis. 
The research setting is considerably case study like, consisting only of two companies 
that operate in a very specific industry. Thus, all the results could be argued to apply 
only in this industry or only to the focal companies. Even between the companies there 
are differences that can weaken the generalizability, for example the unique practice of 
FLSmidth of handling order contract rumors. A major issue for the generalizability is 
the representativeness of announced order contracts of the revenue of a company. For 
Outotec and FLSmidth the announced contracts contributed between 35 to 54 percent of 
total sales, so the situation can be quite different in a company where announced 
contracts represent for example 15 percent or 90 percent of sales. The industry of 
Outotec and FLSmidth is characteristic for valuable contracts that drive the business and 
therefore replicating all of the aspects in this study can be difficult to perform in many 
industries. Another aspect of generalizability is the application of the results to another 
period of time. This thesis applies to years 2006 to 2010 which has been a turbulent 
time in world economy, as the inflation figure (Figure 7) also hints. This leaves a 
question if the valuation of order contracts is different in times of uncertainty than in 
more constant circumstances. 
Summarizing the issues around the cornerstones of a credible research, the possibility to 
reliably replicate this research is on a high level, but the interpretation of the results 
must be carefully done to avoid generalizing the implications too far. The small amount 
of companies and a very specific industry leaves the possibility to broadly generalize 
findings uncertain.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The implications of this thesis focus on many different levels between theoretical and 
practical implications which intertwine with the research objectives. The division of the 
implications follows roughly the classification of event studies suggested by Bowman 
(1983) and Henderson (1990) that is described among the research objectives. The most 
theoretical implications come from the methodological part of event studies. The 
objective was to identify key elements and issues of the methodology, and the outcome 
of this objective is a comprehensive description of the vast amount of event study 
research details. The literature review shows that there is no silver bullet for conducting 
a successful event study, but instead the basic research details must be chosen to meet 
the requirements of research objectives. One key element to be balanced is the abnormal 
return detection rate, which is affected by the size, homogeneity and contentual 
accuracy of the sample combined with the desired time window around an event. As 
some of the results in this thesis reveal, aiming to too specific objectives with 
incompatible research design ends up with highly speculative conclusions. The 
theoretical part of this study serves as a foundation to avoid pitfalls in future event 
studies. Contrasting the theoretical implications to previous literature, the message of 
this thesis is emphasizing the perception that event study methodology is not black-and-
white but highly contingent on the overall research setting. Pre-constructed event study 
checklists (for example Henderson 1990; McWilliams & Siegel 1997) are a good start 
but they are not to be taken to the letter. 
Moving slightly to more practical implications is the research objective examining 
market efficiency. The major question was to find out if announcing individual order 
contracts affects stock prices or is the valuation of order contracts deeper in the 
company business indicators such as the value of backlog. The significant positive 
reaction to order contract announcements implies that single events are contributing to 
the share value of the companies. An interesting follow-up question is that are investors 
valuing the same order contracts again when a company announces an order backlog 
value that deviates from forecasts. The source of the deviation could be the same orders 
to which investors have reacted on the moment of order contract announcement, 
meaning that order contracts are overemphasized. In addition, a study by Rajgopal et al. 
(2003) concludes that investors are overemphasizing the role of order backlog by 
appreciating it on top of the earnings forecasts despite the fact that order backlog is 
already incorporated in the earnings forecasts. Combining the results of this thesis and 
the results of Rajgopal et al. (2003) it would mean that a major order contract is 
incorporated into stock price three times: in the form of order contract announcement, 
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order backlog and as a part of earnings. This is against the market efficiency hypothesis 
because the information content should be incorporated fully in the initial moment of 
order contract announcement. In other words, the stock price reaction found in this 
research follows the market efficiency hypothesis but comparing it with other findings 
in the research field makes the result interestingly contradictory with market efficiency 
principles. A triple valuation of orders would make the whole basis of stock price 
skewed for companies whose business is based on high-value contracts. However, 
additional research is needed to conclude this possibly systematical pricing error. 
Closer examination of information usefulness extends the implications of the research to 
the stakeholders of a company. For investors the results indicate that an investment 
strategy based on reacting to order contract announcements is no free lunch. Although 
the general reaction was found to be positive, the level of positive reaction is minimal 
and thus the gain of the strategy is probably eaten away by the cost of transactions. An 
important remark of the results is the high amount of negative abnormal returns on the 
event day. The negative abnormal return observations also occur independent of order 
contract size. This implies that investors likely have some expectations of an upcoming 
order contract and the announcement fails to meet these expectations. Therefore, 
investors must be well informed of company rumors or analyst coverage to build the 
right expectations to react to the announcements properly. The rejected hypotheses and 
the remaining abnormal return variation indicates that a plenitude of explaining 
variables stay unidentified. In the light of this study these variables can be systematical, 
contingent or purely random. 
The research also includes features of metric explanation study which seeks to explain 
the cross-sectional variation in stock price reaction. The purpose was to find 
systematical reaction to the value of order contract, the business area of order contract 
and the inflation level, but the results are not unanimous. More conclusive evidence 
would create stronger managerial implications but the results nonetheless offer some 
insights to company investor relations. As mentioned earlier, the amount of negative 
abnormal return observations on event day implies that investors have some kind of 
prior expectations of individual contracts. If the guideline of the companies is to avoid 
premature information leakage about the event, the result contrarily shows that some 
information is leaked prior to the event. One suggestion for the companies is to analyze 
the negative abnormal returns one by one to find out why the negative reactions exist, 
for example is there signs of some rumors that overvalue forthcoming order contracts. It 
would be beneficial for companies to correct rumors before they escalate and affect the 
stock price very negatively when the actual event is announced. For the investor relation 
management the research results give insight on disclosure policies. Clearly, even order 
contracts with a value between 5 million and 10 million euros can significantly affect 
stock price, so disclosing small contracts is justifiable. As with the negative abnormal 
returns, the outliers of positive abnormal returns could be identified and analyzed, for 
instance to find out if the wording of order contract announcement could explain the 
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excess positive reaction. On the other hand, if the company has tried to emphasize the 
importance of a specific contract, the results show the success or failure of efficient 
investor communication. 
The limitations of the study arise from the validity issues discussed in the evaluation of 
the research. Generalizability of the results can be questioned at least to other industries 
but even to other companies in the minerals and metals processing technology industry. 
Rather than giving solidly generalizable solutions to the subject, this thesis raises ideas 
of the stock price mechanisms of order contract announcements and tests them with the 
two sample companies. The exact numerical results cannot be transferred to other 
situations but the general directionality of the examined stock price effects is more 
generalizable. This study does not consider the informational content of order contract 
announcements qualitatively but only quantitatively, collecting some main figures from 
the announcements. However, the results and the appendices also enable a qualitative 
approach. 
Regarding the qualitative research approach, a future research proposal is a case study 
of positive and negative outliers to get deeper into the causality of order contract 
announcements and stock price effects. The amount of sample companies could be 
broadened to cater more special cases of order announcements. Although, a challenge 
for this kind of study is the access to the relevant company information, meaning the 
possible rumors, leaked insider information and the implicit value in some order 
contract announcements. One very intriguing finding in the results is the pre-
announcement stock price decline starting about 13 days before the announcement. The 
most significant stock price slump is between days -3 to -5, occurring in both 
companies. The explanation of this negative drift could be that investors are constantly 
waiting for order contract announcements to keep the business running, so no 
announcements means declining business. This thesis does not give any support to the 
cause of the decline, so the wider existence of this phenomenon is a valuable research 
subject. Another approach to the order contract announcement research is to reverse the 
research setting and examine if the order contract announcements of Outotec influence 
the stock price of FLSmidth or vice versa, i.e. is the competitive situation in the industry 
tight enough to create interdependency to the stock prices. The results of that research 
would also reflect to the validity of the results in this thesis, as the interdependency is 
not controlled. 
Generally, event studies are conducted to a wide sample of companies and single 
companies are not relevant, but this thesis highlights the idea of using event studies to 
examine a single event in a limited number of companies. By singling out the reaction 
to a one company it is possible to define how investors consider the actions of a 
company compared to its competitors and thus event study methodology becomes a 
research tool for the area of competitive dynamics. There are still a few methodological 
  76
issues to overcome to get fully reliable results with small samples, but the subject is 
worth exploring those issues. 
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APPENDICES (2 pieces) 
APPENDIX 1: Event list of Outotec Oyj (2 pages) 
   
Included to 
event window 
Date Value (MEUR) Technology +/-1 +/-3 
20.4.2007 45 Grinding x 	  24.5.2007 - Iron ore processing x x 
20.6.2007 - Alumina processing x1 	  20.6.2007 40 Chromite pellet plant x1 	  11.7.2007 40 Alumina calcination x x 
14.8.2007 35 Iron ore sintering x x 
21.8.2007 40 Metal recovery x x 
29.8.2007 25 Zinc smelting x2 	  29.8.2007 30 Grinding x2 	  3.9.2007 75 Water treatment x 	  14.9.2007 - Iron ore sintering x x 
10.10.2007 80 Zinc roasting x 	  16.10.2007 30 Precious metals concentrating x 	  9.11.2007 25 Flotation x x 
21.12.2007 30 Copper plant x x 
26.2.2008 10 Copper smelting x 	  1.4.2008 18 Iron ore sintering x 	  7.4.2008 25 Grinding x 	  11.4.2008 29 Iron ore pelletizing x 	  30.5.2008 90 Sulfuric acid production x x 
17.6.2008 9 Mineral processing x x 
9.7.2008 75 Grinding x 	  12.8.2008 70 Iron ore pelletizing x x 
9.9.2008 25 Iron ore sintering x 	  3.10.2008 175 Copper plant x x 
11.12.2008 28 Phosphate concentrating x 	  22.12.2008 - Oil shale plant x x 
27.1.2009 51 Sulfuric acid production x 	  10.7.2009 110 Oil shale plant x x 
17.9.2009 10 Copper smelting x 	  23.9.2009 7 Flash smelting x 	  6.10.2009 16 Copper plant x x 
28.10.2009 14 Alumina refining x 	  2.12.2009 11 Copper thickening x x 
14.12.2009 - Flotation x 	  25.1.2010 6 Precious metals plant x 	  
  
1.3.2010 116 Copper plant x 	  8.3.2010 119 Manganese sintering x x 
16.4.2010 - Iron ore pelletizing x x 
7.5.2010 - Furnace x 	  12.5.2010 20 Flotation x 	  6.9.2010 13 Copper smelting x 	  30.9.2010 40 Copper concentrating x x 
19.11.2010 45 Ferrochrome production x x 
26.11.2010 70 Water treatment x 	  21.12.2010 25 Alumina refining x 	  11.10.2006 30 Copper-zinc concentrator 	   	  4.1.2007 - Silver refining 	   	  11.1.2007 - Gold thickening 	   	  15.1.2007 - Zinc leaching 	   	  17.1.2007 16 Nickel smelting 	   	  1.2.2007 - Flotation 	   	  12.2.2007 - Gas cleaning 	   	  22.2.2007 15 Precious metals plant 	   	  23.2.2007 - Zinc converting 	   	  27.4.2007 20 Gas cleaning 	   	  25.6.2007 270 Sulfuric acid production 	   	  27.6.2007 20 Alumina calcination 	   	  26.7.2007 100 Alumina anode plant 	   	  27.7.2007 15 Chromite pellet plant 	   	  25.10.2007 20 Grinding 	   	  26.10.2007 22 Iron ore sintering 	   	  18.2.2008 17 Alumina processing 	   	  19.2.2008 21 Mineral processing 	   	  21.2.2008 25 Ferrochrome production 	   	  21.7.2008 90 Copper plant 	   	  3.3.2009 20 Gold thickening 	   	  24.3.2009 15 Mineral processing 	   	  3.2.2010 - Iron ore sintering 	   	  16.3.2010 15 Copper smelting 	   	  17.5.2010 65 Copper plant 	   	  3.8.2010 17 Chromite sintering 	   	  5.8.2010 28 Iron ore processing 	   	  2.9.2010 20 Iron ore sintering 	   	  1, 2 Combined to single event  
  
APPENDIX 2: Event list of FLSmidth Co. A/S (3 pages) 
   Event window 
Date Value (MEUR) Technology +/-1 +/-3 
20.2.2006 206,7 Cement production x x 
10.3.2006 60 Cement production x 	  21.3.2006 - Cement production x x 
2.5.2006 50,8 Cement production x 	  6.6.2006 57 Cement production x x 
15.6.2006 34,9 Cement kiln x x 
22.6.2006 35 Cement production x x 
24.8.2006 43 Cement production x x 
7.9.2006 34,2 Cement production x 	  19.10.2006 40,2 Cement production x x 
24.10.2006 28,6 Cement kiln x 	  30.11.2006 68,2 Ferronickel processing x x 
14.12.2006 28 Cement production x x 
11.1.2007 52 Cement production x x 
23.4.2007 48 Cement production x 	  21.12.2007 139 Cement production x 	  2.1.2008 64 Cement production x x 
9.1.2008 40 Cement production x x 
17.1.2008 65 Cement production x 	  25.1.2008 - Iron ore plant x 	  31.1.2008 33,6 Mineral processing x 	  14.2.2008 105,3 Iron ore plant x x 
4.3.2008 49,3 Cement production x 	  27.5.2008 41,4 Alumina refining x 	  30.5.2008 - Cement production x 	  4.6.2008 76 Cement production x 	  11.6.2008 63 Cement production x x 
19.6.2008 100 Cement production x x 
30.6.2008 158,8 Copper processing x 	  8.7.2008 95 Cement production x x 
23.7.2008 119 Cement production x x 
8.8.2008 28,7 Coal handling x 	  23.9.2008 30,2 Cement production x 	  30.9.2008 78,5 Cement production x x 
15.10.2008 37,2 Ferronickel processing x x 
31.10.2008 35,4 Copper mining x x 
12.3.2009 40 Steel handling x x 
31.3.2009 22,7 Cement pyro x x 
18.6.2009 - Cement production x x 
9.7.2009 29,3 Alumina grinding x x 
21.7.2009 30 Cement production x x 
3.8.2009 13,4 Alumina calcination x 	  7.8.2009 - Coke calcination x 	  22.9.2009 43 Cement operation x x 
  
14.10.2009 130 Cement production x x 
30.10.2009 35 Coal handling x x 
9.11.2009 21 Cement production x x 
24.11.2009 26,7 Coal handling x 	  30.11.2009 20 Copper mining x 	  22.12.2009 - Cement production x x 
14.1.2010 - Cement kiln x x 
22.2.2010 29,4 Mineral processing x 	  11.3.2010 154 Cement operation x 	  15.3.2010 53 Coal handling x 	  31.3.2010 23 Copper filters x x 
9.4.2010 - Gold production x x 
21.4.2010 15,2 Coal handling x x 
3.5.2010 37,1 Gold production x 	  12.5.2010 59,4 Copper production x 	  21.5.2010 107 Cement production x1 	  21.5.2010 65 Cement operation x1 	  2.6.2010 30 Gold production x 	  2.7.2010 - Cement pyro x x 
13.7.2010 34,6 Cement pyro x x 
4.11.2010 28,2 Iron ore plant x 	  8.11.2010 21,6 Iron ore crushing x 	  11.11.2010 - Cement production x 	  10.12.2010 30 Cement production x 	  10.5.2006 144 Cement production 	   	  3.7.2006 53,2 Copper processing 	   	  25.1.2007 90 Cement production 	   	  29.5.2007 72 Ferronickel processing 	   	  12.12.2007 44,2 Mineral processing 	   	  28.2.2008 26,3 Cement mill 	   	  13.3.2008 40 Cement production 	   	  18.3.2008 60 Cement production 	   	  17.4.2008 55 Cement production 	   	  26.6.2008 - Cement  production 	   	  27.6.2008 79,3 Cement production 	   	  4.8.2008 30,2 Copper processing 	   	  5.8.2008 47 Cement production 	   	  18.9.2008 39 Mineral rolling mill 	   	  10.11.2008 40 Cement production 	   	  11.11.2008 49,6 Copper processing 	   	  30.12.2008 33,9 Iron ore milling 	   	  31.12.2008 44,4 Copper processing 	   	  30.7.2009 55 Cement production 	   	  31.7.2009 55 Cement production 	   	  26.2.2010 48 Cement production 	   	  6.5.2010 70 Phosphate handling 	   	  7.5.2010 49,5 Copper mining 	   	  26.5.2010 34 Cement production 	   	  
  
28.5.2010 32,1 Cement production 	   	  10.6.2010 36 Coal handling 	   	  5.1.2011 24,3 Cement mill 	   	  25.3.2011 95 Coal handling 	   	  29.4.2011 22,2 Gold grinding 	   	  12.5.2011 55 Cement production 	   	  31.5.2011 - Cement production 	   	  1 Combined to single event 
